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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On February 20, 2012, Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Secretary of 
State, and Patricia Espinoza, Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, 
formally signed the U.S.-Mexico Agreement on Transboundary Hydrocarbon 
Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico.1 In the remarks made at the signing of 
this agreement, Secretary of State Clinton said: 
If a reservoir straddles the boundary, then there would be disputes over who 
should do the extraction and how much they should extract. The agreement we 
sign today helps prevent such disputes. It also helps promote the safe, efficient, 
and equitable exploration and production of cross-boundary reservoirs. Each 
country maintains its own right to develop its own resources. . . . [T]his 
agreement creates new opportunities. And for the first time, American 
companies will be able to collaborate with PEMEX, their Mexican counterpart.2 
1. To underline the importance of this agreement, Mexico’s President Felipe
Calderón served as a witness at the signing ceremony at Los Cabos, Baja California Sur, 
as part of the events related to the G-20 meeting. See U.S. in Accord with Mexico on 
Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012; Tania Rosas, México y E.U. Pactan Explotación en 
el Golfo [Mexico and the U.S. Agree on Gulf Exploitation], ECONOMISTA, Feb. 20, 2012, 
http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/2012/02/20/mexico-eu-firman-acuerdo-petrolero. 
2. Hilary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Signing of the U.S.-
Mexico Transboundary Agreement (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/ 
2012/02/184236.htm. Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar and Mexican Minister of 
Energy Jordy Herrera attended the signing of the agreement. See Press Release, Dep’t of 
VARGAS (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2016  4:09 PM 
6 
The signing of this truly unprecedented agreement is unique for the 
following reasons: (a) The agreement offers the prospects of opening up 
for commercial exploitation submarine oil and natural gas reservoirs 
deemed to be the fourth largest in the world;3 (b) The agreement removes 
uncertainties regarding the development of transboundary resources of 
nearly 1.5 million acres of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf;4 (c) The 
agreement establishes a legal regime whereby companies of both countries 
will be able to jointly develop transboundary reservoirs; (d) The agreement 
allows U.S. oil companies to invest and to enter into contracts with 
PEMEX for the exploration and exploitation of these reservoirs, a most 
unprecedented legal change in the legislative history of Mexico; (e) And, 
finally, this agreement moves the United States and Mexico closer to 
completing all the needed maritime boundary delimitations between both 
countries in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean regarding marine 
waters, the continental shelf and the corresponding seabed and subsoil 
areas. 
Given the agreement’s significant importance, on May 19, 2010, President 
Barack Obama announced his intention to negotiate the agreement 
following the Joint Statement adopted by Presidents Obama and Calderón 
at the conclusion of President Calderón’s State Visit to Washington on 
May 19, 2010.5 
From the Mexican side, the Secretariat of Energy (SENER) reported 
that six bilateral technical meetings and three formal negotiating reunions 
by the corresponding teams of Mexico and the United States were 
the Interior, Sec. Salazar Joins Mexican President Calderon, Sec. Clinton, Mexican 
Officials to Announce Agreement Providing Access to Nearly 1.5 Million Acres of the 




3. Richard T. Buffler, Seismic Statigraphy of the Deep Gulf of Mexico Basin and
Adjacent Margins, in THE GULF OF MEXICO BASIN 353 (Amos Salvador ed., 1991); see 
also Richard Nehring, Oil and Gas Resources, in THE GULF OF MEXICO BASIN 446 
(Amos Salvador ed., 1991). 
4. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Sec. Salazar Joins Mexican President
Calderon, Sec. Clinton, Mexican Officials to Announce Agreement Providing Access to 
Nearly 1.5 Million Acres of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (Feb. 20, 2012) (on file 
with author), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Sec-Salazar-Joins-Mexican- 
President-Calderon-Sec-Clinton-Mexican-Officials-to-Announce-Agreement-Providing- 
Access-to-Nearly-1-point-5-Million-Acres-of-the-US-Outer-Continental-Shelf.cfm. 
5. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S.-Mexico Intention to Negotiate
Hydrocarbon Reservoirs Agreement (June 23, 2010) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/143573.htm. Both presidents agreed “to extend 
a moratorium on drilling and exploitation in a zone near the continental shelf boundary 
in an area known as the Western Gap . . . until January 2014 without prejudice to any 
further extension.”  Id. 
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necessary to agree on the numerous legal questions included in the final 
text of this long and technical agreement.6 The negotiation of this bilateral 
instrument was a most difficult task for both SENER and the Secretariat 
of Foreign Affairs (SRE). Nine days after the agreement was signed, the 
Secretariat of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación) transmitted 
the 2012 Agreement to the Mexican Senate7 with the purpose of obtaining 
the “Senate’s Approval” required by Article 76, Paragraph I, and Article 
133 of Mexico’s Political Constitution.8 
Scientifically, the Gulf of Mexico has virtually become a “marine 
province” of the United States, because of its peculiar configuration, its 
geographical contiguity to the U.S., and especially because of its valuable 
resources, in particular oil and natural gas. In a foremost scientific 
compilation by the Department of Geological Sciences of the University 
of Texas at Austin, published under the auspices of The Geological Society 
of America in 1991, these statements are made regarding the petroleum 
resources known to exist in that Gulf: 
6. Luis Carriles, México y EU firman Pacto sobre Crudo en el Golfo [Mexico and
the U.S. Sign Oil Pact for the Gulf], UNIVERSAL NACIÓN, Feb. 20, 2012, http://www. 
eluniversal.com.mx/notas/831288.html; see also Tania Rosas, México y Estados Unidos 
Pactan Explotación en el Golfo [Mexico and the U.S. Agree on Gulf Exploitation]. 
ECONOMISTA, Feb. 23, 2011, http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/2012/02/20/mexico-
eu-firman-acuerdo-petrolero. While commenting on the new agreement, Senator Juan 
Bueno Torio of the Senate’s Energy Commission suggested the necessity of addressing 
the vast trans-frontier reservoirs of water and natural gas in the State of Tamaulipas that 
are currently being tapped by the United States from the contiguous lands in Texas. Id. 
7. Insta SG a Senado a Ratificar el Acuerdo Petrolero con EU [Secretariat of the
Interior Seeks Ratification of the Oil Agreement with the U.S.] RADIO LA NUEVA 
REPÚBLICA, Feb. 29, 2012, http://www.lanuevarepublica.org/?p=26720. The agreement 
was transmitted by the Secretariat of the Interior to the Senate’s Commissions of Energy 
and Foreign Relations for their consideration and ratification.  Id. 
8. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P], as amended,
Art. 76, pfo. I, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). The 
Political Constitution of Mexico includes among the exclusive powers of the Senate 
“[T]he approval (Aprobación) of international treaties and diplomatic conventions that 
the Federal Executive subscribes, as well as his decision to terminate, denounce, 
suspend, modify, amend, withdraw reservations and formulate interpretive declarations 
regarding said treaties and conventions.” The Senate’s exclusive powers (Facultades 
exclusivas) include “the approval of international treaties and diplomatic conventions 
signed by the Federal Executive.” SISTA, CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS 
UNIDOS MEXICANOS: TODOS LOS GOBERNANTES DE MÉXICO 97, 183 (2012). Mexico’s 
Senate “approval” of treaties and conventions is equivalent to the U.S. Senate’s advice 
and consent required by the Executive from the U.S. Senate regarding international 
instruments pursuant to the Constitution of the United States (Art. II, Section 2). 
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The Gulf of Mexico basin is one of the foremost petroleum provinces of the 
world. As of the end of 1987, it has demonstrated ultimate known recovery of of 
112.7 billion barrels of crude oil, 22.5 billion barrels of natural gas liquids (for a 
total of 136.6 billion barrels of petroleum liquids, and 523.8 cubic feet of 
natural gas), for a total of 222.5 billion barrels oil equivalent. 
. . . . 
As a producing petroleum province, the Gulf of Mexico basin belongs in the 
same rank as the Arabian-Iranian province of the Middle East and the West 
Siberian province of the Soviet Union. The Gulf of Mexico basin contains 
approximately 9% of the world’s known recovery of petroleum liquids (crude 
oil and natural gas liquids) and approximately 11% of the world’s known 
recovery of natural gas. 
. . . . 
The Gulf of Mexico basin is primarily an oil-producing petroleum province. Of 
the 222.5 billion barrels oil equivalent ultimate recovery as of the end of 1987, 
50.7% were crude oil, 10.1 were natural gas liquids, and only 40.2% were 
natural gas. The relative importance of petroleum liquids and natural gas varies 
substantially across the basin. The southern half (in Mexico) is highly oil prone, 
with more than 81% of its oil equivalent known ultimate recovery consisting of 
crude oil and natural gas. By comparison, the northern half (in the United 
States) is more gas prone, gas providing more than 52% of its oil equivalent 
ultimate known recovery.9 
These authoritative scientific statements leave no doubt as to the importance 
the Gulf of Mexico plays regarding its oil and natural gas deposits not 
only for today but especially for the next seven or eight decades to come, 
when the scarcity of oil will increase on a global scale, a serious 
consideration that underlines the clear strategic value of this basin for 
the United States and Mexico. 
In a world that is already witnessing the alarming increase in the costs 
of oil and natural gas due to the rapid diminution of oil reserves, the 
2012 Agreement acquires greater significance as every day that goes by. 
This agreement may be described as the very first business partnership 
between the United States and Mexico. A partnership that lays down fair 
rules and objective mechanisms to avoid disputes; establishes a modern 
legal regime to share a fluid transfrontier resource based on mutually 
agreed principles, allowing both countries to proceed with an equitable, 
safe and efficient utilization of that resource; and, at the same time, 
promotes and protects the preservation of the marine environment. 
In sum, this is the first business partnership between the United States 
and Mexico; a partnership that took almost two centuries to come to 
fruition. One that will grow stronger as time goes by and that is likely to 
be extended to other business areas, as these two neighboring countries 
improve their mutual confidence and understanding. 
9. Nehring, supra note 3, at 446.
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This Article is divided into four parts. Parts I and II describe each of 
the four previous U.S.-Mexico maritime delimitation treaties of 1970, 
1976, 1978, and 2000. These treaties represent different degrees of progress 
in the process of completing the maritime boundaries that geographical 
contiguity imposes upon these contiguous countries. This was a slow 
and careful process that spanned almost half a century. Part III analyzes 
the 2012 U.S.-Mexico Agreement on Transboundary Hydrocarbon 
Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico from an international law perspective, 
with special reference to the interests of the United States and Mexico. 
Finally, Part IV advances a number of conclusions. 
II. THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN
MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 
From an international law viewpoint, the establishment of international 
boundaries is among the most important and delicate questions to take 
place in the course of diplomatic relations between countries. 
Experience demonstrates that the demarcation of international boundaries 
—whether territorial or maritime—represents the end of an intricate 
balancing of legal, technical, diplomatic, strategic, and political  
considerations.10 The establishment of these boundaries constitutes an act 
of state that takes place when an agreement is reached between 
geographically contiguous countries as reflected in the language of the 
corresponding treaties or in the decisions rendered by international 
tribunals, including the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Under 
international law today, no international boundary between countries is 
to be established unilaterally by a single state. 
In the United States, according to Feldman and Colson,11 there is a 
“constitutional tradition that boundaries are [to be] made by treaty. . . .”12 
10. See generally Bernard H. Oxman. International Maritime Boundaries: Political,
Strategic, and Historical Considerations, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 243, 243–95 
(1995). See also Jorge A. Vargas. Mexico’s Legal Regime Over its Marine Spaces: A 
Proposal for the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Deepest Part of the Gulf of 
Mexico, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 189, 190 (1995) [hereinafter Mexico’s Legal 
Regime]. 
11. See Mark B. Feldman & David Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the
United States, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 729, 739–740 (1981). For constitutional provisions 
supporting these assertions, and for the various treaties entered into by the President 
pursuant to this interpretation, see footnote 43 in same article. 
12. Id.
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This tradition is based on compelling prudential considerations. The President 
makes boundary treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, but he alone 
negotiates. The power to negotiate encompasses the power to define a negotiating 
position. In the context of boundary treaties, the power to propose translates into 
the power to claim territory or jurisdiction for the United States. Moreover, 
pending conclusion of a boundary treaty, U.S. law must still be enforced in 
boundary regions.13 
The importance of international boundaries resides in the fact that they 
define the territory under the sovereignty of the state, subject to its exclusive 
control, jurisdiction and authority. As predicated by the Declaration of 
Uruguay of 1933, the territory is one of the four indispensable components 
required by international law to recognize the modern concept of state.14 
Historically, it should be recalled that the very first boundary between 
Mexico and the United States was not the result of a mutual agreement 
but it was imposed to Mexico as a consequence of a war lost by that 
country when the United States was undergoing an era of territorial 
expansionism. As a consequence of its military defeat, Mexico lost more 
than half of its territory, as detailed in Article V of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848.15 In his message to Congress to report on 
the end of his “war of conquest” (sic) against Mexico, President Polk 
estimated that the newly acquired territory totaled over 851,598 square 
miles, more than half of the Republic of Mexico’s territory.16 Pursuant to 
Article 12 of the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty, “in consideration of the 
 
 13. Id. These considerations were made in light of the establishment of a Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976. In 1976, “emphasis was placed on the 
determination of a U.S. position in each boundary situation that would be consistent with 
U.S. political, security, and economic interests, and justifiable under international law.” 
Id. at 737. 
 14. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States Adopted by the Seventh 
International Conference of American States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25. Article 
I of this Convention reads: “The State as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: (a) permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c). government; 
and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other States.” Id. (emphasis added); see 
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 45–46, (2d ed. 
2006); see also HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 207 (1961). 
 15. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement Between the United States 
of America and the United Mexican States, art. 5, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo]; TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 207, 213–16 (Hunter Miller ed., 1937) [hereinafter 
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS]. The Treaty was ratified by the United 
States on March 16, 1848, and by Mexico on May 30, 1848. TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 15, at 207. The ratifications were exchanged in 
Querétaro, Mexico, May 30, 1848, and it was proclaimed on July 4, 1848. Id. 
 16. See LUIS G. ZORRILLA, HISTORIA DE LAS RELACIONES ENTRE MEXICO Y LOS 
ESTODOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA, 1800–1958, at 227 (1977). Luis G. Zorrilla, a diplomat 
and historian who studied the relations between both countries, characterizes this Treaty 
“imposed to Mexico as one of the harshest in modern history, if the World War II 
treaties are excepted, given the enormous extension of territory which was taken away 
from Mexico.” Id. 
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extension acquired by the boundaries of the United States,” the United 
States paid Mexico fifteen million dollars.17 
A.  The Land Boundary Between Mexico and the United States 
Not surprisingly, during the first decades of the bilateral relationship 
between these two countries, questions pertaining to land boundaries were 
considered to be a delicate diplomatic matter.18 As a consequence of the 
1848 Mexican-American War and the profound impact that its devastating 
effects produced upon the psyche of the Mexican people and the economy 
of their country, boundary relations between the United States and Mexico 
were placed in a special category. 
Thus, boundary questions formed an old and technical chapter where 
the professional and efficient work of the original International Boundary 
Commission—later expanded by the Treaty of 1944 to become the 
current International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC)—whose 
professional and technical work has played an important role in these 
matters. 
The history of the boundary chapter between the United States and 
Mexico commenced with the laborious demarcation of the land boundary 
between both countries based on Article V of the Guadalupe Hidalgo 
Treaty of 1848,19 as modified by Article I of the Gadsden Purchase of 
1853.20 Today, and since 1848, the international land boundary between 
 
 17. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, art. 12, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922. According to 
Zorrilla, the price of an individual hectare of Mexican land acquired by the U.S. was less 
than ten cents of a U.S. dollar! This author points out that one generation prior to the 
Treaty of 1848, the United States used to sell the lands that it had obtained from the 
Indians at no less than $1.25 per acre, which is close to $3.00 U.S. dollars per hectare 
(one hectare equals 0.405 acre per hectare, or 2.471 acres per hectare). Based on this 
calculation, the sum that the United States should have paid Mexico, according to 
Zorrilla, was in the order of over half a billion dollars! See Jorge A. Vargas, Is the 
International Boundary Between the United States and Mexico Wrongly Demarcated? 
An Academic Inquiry into Certain Diplomatic, Legal, and Technical Considerations 
Regarding the Boundary in the San Diego-Tijuana Region, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 215, 
253 (2000). 
 18. See Feldman & Colson, supra note 11, at 743. Due to the delicate historical 
background created by the 1848 Treaty, two members of the U.S. Office of the Legal 
Adviser of the Department of State wrote: “Even in modern times, some boundary issues 
with Mexico have been very difficult.” Id. 
 19. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 15. 
 20. Gadsden Purchase Treaty, art. 1, Dec. 30, 1853, 10 Stat. 1031. This treaty is 
known in Mexico as Tratado de La Mesilla and was signed on December 30, 1853. 
Article I of the treaty modified a portion of the international boundary between the 
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both countries extends for a total of 1,951.67 miles.21 This boundary 
consists of two types of limits: 
1. A natural or arcifinious boundary22 formed by the River Grande 
(known in Mexico as Río Bravo del Norte, jointly with the 
rivers Colorado and Tijuana), which runs 1254 miles from El 
Paso, Texas, to the Gulf of Mexico; and 
2. An artificial boundary established by straight lines that unite 
specific points defined by their coordinates of latitude and 
longitude. These artificial lines measure 179.96 miles in New 
Mexico, 376.98 miles in Arizona (including today’s twenty-
four miles of the Colorado River) and 140.73 miles in California, 
for a total of 697.67 miles.23 
During the first 122 years, the IBWC,24 originally established in 1890, 
 
United States and Mexico. As part of the treaty the United States purchased a tract of 
land from Mexico of 29,640 square miles in an area (bounded on the North by the Gila 
River, on the East by the Rio Grande, and on the West by the Colorado River) for 
$10,000 dollars. The U.S. Senate made some modifications and finally ratified the treaty 
on April 25, 1854. The treaty was proclaimed on June 30, 1854. 
 21. See generally LEON C. METZ, BORDER: THE U.S.–MEXICO LINE (1989); but see 
U.S.-Mexico Boundary Map, INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, http://www.ibwc. 
state.gov/Files/US–Mx_Boundary_Map.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2012) (estimating the 
U.S.–Mexico boundary to be approximately 1,954 miles). 
 22. Natural or arcifinious boundaries are those formed by rivers, lakes, mountains, 
or various accidents of nature, visible to the eye. Historically, they date back to Roman 
law and the Corpus Iuris Civilis. See Instituta, Lib. II, Tit. I, § 2. 
 23. Leon Metz reports that the “official” length of this boundary totals 1,951.36 
miles divided this way: 1,253.69 miles of the Rio Grande; 697 miles from El Paso, Texas 
to the Pacific, and 23.72 miles of the brief stretch of the Colorado River. See METZ, 
supra note 21; see also ZORRILLA, supra note 16, at 233. 
 24. The International Boundary Commission (IBC) was established in 1890 by the 
Convention of March 1, 1889. The IBC was originally created to apply the rules that the 
Convention of November 12, 1884 established for determining the location of the U.S.-
Mexico boundary when the meandering international rivers between both countries 
transferred tracts of land from one bank of the river to the other. Treaties Between the 
U.S. and Mexico, INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, http://www.ibwc.state.gov/ Treaties_ 
Minutes/treaties.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). These rules were not originally 
included in the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty of 1848.  See id.  With the signing of the 
Treaty of February 3, 1944, the functions and jurisdiction of the IBC were expanded to 
include the control and accountability of the transfer of water from one country to the 
other, principally from the waters of the Colorado River to Mexico.  Id.  The name of the 
IBC was also changed to the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) 
through the 1944 treaty.  Id.  Headed by two Commissioners, one from the U.S. and the 
other from Mexico, the IBWC performs eminently technical work. The IBWC consists 
of two Sections, one located in El Paso, Texas, and the other located in Ciudad Juárez, 
Chihuahua, Mexico. The agreements between the Commissioners are recorded in 
“Minutes,” akin to an international bilateral agreement when approved by the U.S. 
Department of State and the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. 
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addressed only land boundary cases based on a number of specific treaties25 
designed to resolve problems resulting from the natural meandering of 
the international rivers. Towards the end of this long period, the most 
important case was the resolution of the “Chamizal case” in 1963.26 This 
case is considered perhaps the most controversial case whose final 
settlement was delayed for decades because of the refusal by the United 
States to comply with the arbitral award rendered in 1911 by an 
International Arbitral Commission established ex profeso to resolve this 
land dispute. 
The severe conditions imposed upon Mexico by the Guadalupe Treaty 
of 1848, and later the unexpected refusal by the United States to comply 
with the arbitral award, contributed to the difficult diplomatic relationship 
between the two countries that prevailed until the first half of the twentieth 
century.27 
Today, given the technical and professional work of the IBWC, there 
are no boundary problems between the two countries. The work in this area 
generally consists in the replacement of boundary monuments, vigilance 
 
 25. Id. Subsequent to the Treaty of 1848, which established the U.S.-Mexico 
international boundary, the following specially negotiated bilateral agreements were 
created: 1) the Convention of July 29, 1882; 2) the Convention of November 12, 1884; 
3) Convention of March 1, 1889; 4) Convention of February 1, 1933; 5) Treaty of 
February 3, 1944; and 6) the Chamizal Convention of August 29, 1963.  Id. 
 26. See generally JORGE A. VARGAS, EL CASO DEL CHAMIZAL (1963). This 100-
year old case was finally resolved by the Chamizal Convention of August 29, 1963. The 
IBWC relocated 4.34 miles of the Rio Grande Channel and lined this portion of the 
channel with concrete. The United States received portions of Corte de la Isla de 
Córdoba and transferred 437 acres of land to Mexico.  Id. 
 27. The Chamizal Case involved a dispute over lands in the area of El Paso, Texas, 
and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico, that resulted from the meanderings of the Rio 
Grande. The IBC was unable to resolve the dispute, and both countries submitted the 
case in 1910 to an International Arbitral Commission formed by the U.S. and Mexico 
Commissioners and a third arbiter, Canada’s Eugene LaFleur. The arbitral award, 
rendered by a majority vote on June 15, 1911, divided the land between the contending 
parties pursuant to well recognized Civil law principles. However, Anson Mills, the U.S. 
Commissioner, cast a dissenting vote and later objected the award based on Excés de 
pouvoir.  He declared the award invalid and refusing to abide by the decision. After 
many decades of a difficult impasse, both countries negotiated an agreement based on the 
Chamizal Convention of 1963. See id. at 111–12; see also ANTONIO GÓMEZ ROBLEDO, 
MÉXICO Y EL ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL: EL FONDO PIADOSO DE LAS CALIFORNIAS: LA 
ISLA DE LA PASIÓN Y EL CHAMIZAL 221–30, 235 (2d ed. 1975); 1 Hackworth DIGEST § 60, 
at 417. 
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of the boundary,28 flood control works and the punctual and annual delivery 
of international waters of the Colorado River to Mexico, as established 
by the applicable treaties and minutes between these countries. 
B.  Maritime Delimitations Based on Four Bilateral Treaties 
According to international law, maritime boundaries are the agreements 
between states consisting of boundary lines that separate the areas under 
the sovereignty, control, or authority of the respective coastal states in 
the marine environment (involving the waters, the seabed and the 
corresponding subsoil). Conceptually, the term “delimitation” is commonly 
used to refer to the “establishment of boundaries between neighboring 
states.”29 
Traditionally, international boundaries may be established by land, 
marine environment, or atmosphere. Because of their legal nature, 
the establishment of these boundaries—including maritime boundaries— 
constitutes an act of a given state, as a subject of international law.30 
Accordingly, maritime agreements are always understood to be entered 
into “in good faith” between the contracting states,31 which must recognize, 
respect, and protect those boundaries before the international community 
in conformance with international law and practice. 
In the past, the demarcation of maritime boundaries was an activity 
performed by cartographers and geographers. It was during the late 15th 
century when the discovery of remote and unknown lands—such as the 
distant provinces of America, Africa, and Asia—was an exercise that 
tended to fluctuate between the “era of imaginary geography,”32 when 
the cartographers found it difficult to distinguish between fantasy and 
reality, and the era when the determination of degrees of latitude and 
longitude accurately placed a ship or a continent anywhere in the geography 
 
 28. This technical work of the IBWC should not be confused with the protection of 
the international boundary between both countries conducted by the Border Patrol 
(Patrulla Fronteriza) of the Department of Homeland Security. 
 29. See NUNO MARQUES ANTUNES, TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME 
DELIMITATION: LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF A POLITICAL PROCESS 7 (2003). 
 30. See Oxman, supra note 10, at 243–95; see also Vargas, Mexico’s Legal Regime, 
supra note 10, at 190. 
 31. See Feldman & Colson, supra note 11, at 738. According to Feldman and 
Colson, “the duty to negotiate in good faith flows . . . from the principle of the sovereign 
equality of states and the obligation of states to settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means, which are both recognized in the Charter of the United Nations.” Id. 
Feldman and Colson assert that this principle has been “affirmed by the International 
Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases” and that “[t]he United States 
[has] recognized this principle in the 1945 Truman Proclamation [on the Continental 
Shelf] and continues to attach importance to it.” Id. 
 32. See HENRY R. WAGNER, THE CARTOGRAPHY OF THE NORTHWEST COAST OF 
AMERICA TO THE YEAR 1800, at 5–12 (1968). 
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of this planet. It was at this time when boundary delimitation was 
transferred to diplomats, jurists, and naval officers.33 
However, as a result of the scientific and technological advancements 
(such as the computer, artificial satellites and the positional location by 
Global Positioning System (GPS)), in recent decades the drawing and 
graphic depiction of boundary delimitations have been conducted under 
the technical and specialized work of scientists, engineers, and computer 
technicians. 
1.  Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and                       
Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River                                               
as the International Boundary (1970) 
Turning now to the United States and Mexico, it was not until 1970 
when the IBWC was officially asked to become involved in the first case 
that required the establishment of an international maritime boundary 
between both countries. This was the case that took place as a result of 
the Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the 
Rio Grande and the Colorado River as the International Boundary, signed in 
Mexico City on November 23, 1970.34 
Between the 1950s and 1970s, a number of developing states made 
maritime claims extending out 200 nautical miles in order to control the 
utilization of living resources off their coasts.35 This trend was initiated 
by three countries in Latin America—Chile, Ecuador, and Peru—whose 
tripartite “Santiago Declaration of 1952” was the first to establish a 
maritime zone of 200 nautical miles off their coasts.36 Around that time, 
 
 33. See MARQUES ANTUNES, supra note 29, at 1–9. 
 34. Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande 
and Colorado River as the International Boundary, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 23, 1970, T.I.A.S 
7313 [hereinafter Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences]. The treaty was 
signed in Mexico City on December 18 and 21, 1970. Ratification was advised by the 
U.S. Senate on November 29, 1971, and the treaty was ratified by Mexico on January 24, 
1972. The treaty was proclaimed by the President of the U.S. on May 2, 1972, and 
entered into force on April 18, 1972. 
 35. See Robert D. Hodgson & Robert W. Smith, Boundary Issues Created by 
Extended National Marine Jurisdiction, 69 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 423, 423 (1979). From 
the perspective of two leading U.S. specialists on maritime delimitation, as a 
consequence of these extended maritime claims, “every coastal state in the world will 
eventually have to negotiate at least one maritime boundary with at least one neighbor.” 
 36. See JORGE A. VARGAS, MEXICO AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
COMPROMISES 127–41 (Vaughan Lowe & Robin Churchill eds., 2011) [hereinafter 
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Mexico had a different but special interest in enlarging its territorial sea 
out to twelve nautical miles to place this width in symmetry with the 
latest trends taking place at that time among developing coastal states. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the width of the territorial sea was not 
only fluid but also subject to a strong expansionist trend. According to 
the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE), by 1969, thirty-nine states had 
already adopted a twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea. The large number 
of states that had already adopted this new width convinced Mexico to 
join this movement. This movement was indicative of an emerging state 
practice that was reasonable and uniform at that time.37 
From an original marginal belt of three nautical miles established in 
1902,38 Mexico enlarged its territorial sea to nine nautical miles in 1906, 
and by means of a Presidential decree, it further amended its General Act of 
Immovable Assets (Ley General de Bienes Inmuebles) in 1969, enlarging its 
territorial sea to twelve nautical miles (22,224 meters).39 Thus, Mexico 
became one of the very first countries in the Western hemisphere to 
adopt a twelve-nautical mile territorial sea.40 
Today, in consonance with Article 3 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (to which Mexico is a party), Article 25 of the 
Federal Oceans Act (Ley Federal del Mar)41 establishes a twelve-nautical 
mile territorial sea along Mexico’s maritime littorals. 
Since the time the United States became a nation in 1776, this country 
has adhered to the traditional three-nautical-mile limit of the territorial 
sea that was originally established by England, and historically associated 
with the range of a cannon.42 In the 1950s, when certain Latin American 
 
MEXICO AND THE LAW OF THE SEA] (reviewing the origin and development of these 
maritime claims). 
 37. See Antonio Gómez Robledo, El Derecho del Mar en la Legislación Mexicana 
[The Law of the Sea in Mexican Law], in MEXICO Y EL REGIMEN DEL MAR [MEXICO AND 
THE OCEAN’S LEGAL REGIME] (1974); Alfonso García Robles. Desarrollo y Codificación 
de las Normas Básicas del Derecho del Mar hasta 1960 [Development and Codification 
Standards of the Basic Law of the Sea Until 1960], in MÉXICO Y EL RÉGIMEN DEL MAR 
(1974). 
 38. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 15 (stating the width of the territorial 
sea at that time was considered to be three-nautical miles). This was mutually agreed by 
Mexico and the United States to be the width of the territorial sea. 
 39. See Ley General de Bienes Nacionales [General Act of National Assets], as 
amended, art. 18, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 26 de Diciembre de 1969 
(Mex.). 
 40. For a detailed discussion of this question, see VARGAS, MEXICO AND THE LAW 
OF THE SEA, supra note 36, at 86–92. 
 41. Ley Federal del Mar [Federal Oceans Act], Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DO], 8 de Enero de 1986 (Mex.). For an English translation of this Act, see VARGAS, 
MEXICO AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 36, app. 2, at 103–20. 
 42. See Feldman & Colson, supra note 11, at 730 n.4 (citing United States v. 
Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 1979); U.S. Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
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countries made their claims for an extended maritime jurisdiction out to 
200 nautical miles, the United States and other major maritime countries 
strongly opposed the claims as an intrusion on the freedom of the high 
seas.43 
International rivers that function as international boundaries, such as 
the Rio Grande and the Rio Colorado, for example, are subject to natural 
phenomena such as floods, changes of course, and formation of islands, 
as reported by ancient Roman law.44 Over the passage of considerable 
time, i.e., between 1848 when the boundary was established and 1970 
when the treaty in question was signed, these river phenomena had become 
cumulative and, as a consequence, they altered considerably the course 
and direction of the river. This created confusion and associated problems 
that may have resulted in serious legal and diplomatic situations between 
the American and Mexican towns with populations located at each side 
of these international rivers. 
To avoid these problems, it is common practice between neighboring 
States confronting these river changes to enter into bilateral agreements 
to try to restore and re-establish the original river boundary whenever 
possible and practical or, in the alternative, to agree to undertake engineering 
and other river works to establish a new and more practical international 
river boundary. This was precisely the purpose of the 1970 treaty. 
However, because at that time—as indicated earlier45—many coastal 
states in the international community started to advance maritime claims 
over contiguous marine areas, such as was the case of Mexico enlarging 
its territory in 1969,46 both the United States and Mexico agreed that 
since the IBWC was already engaged in establishing a more practical and 
convenient river boundary along certain segments of the international 
line, it was only proper to ask that Commission to also address the 
question of establishing the new international maritime boundary of a 
twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea in the Gulf of Mexico (starting at the 
center of the mouth of the Rio Grande47), and the same maritime boundary 
 
Implementation and Enforcement of Laws, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,906 (June 1, 1972); 
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (1995)). 
 43. See Action by Other Countries, 4 Whiteman § 4, at 796, 798–99. 
 44. See Instituta, Lib. II, Tit. I, § 2; Gaius, Lib. II, § 70; Digesto, Lib. I, § 20; see 
also Code Napoleon (1804), bk. 3, tit. 1, ch. 5, § 3 at 796, 798, 800. 
 45. See VARGAS, MEXICO AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 36, at 86–90. 
 46. Id. at 88. 
 47. See Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences, supra note 34, at art. 5, 
para. A. The Treaty was signed in Mexico City on November 23, 1970 with Exchange of 
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in the Pacific Ocean (beginning at the western most point of the mainland 
boundary).48 
Both countries agreed that the definition and establishment of these 
maritime boundaries was to be done through a series of straight lines, 
and in conformance with the “Principle of equidistance,”49 as provided by 
Articles 12 and 24 of the U.N. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone of 1958,50 to which both countries were a party. 
The new maritime boundaries were recognized as “permanent” and as 
having superseded the provisional maritime boundaries referred to in the 
Commission’s Minute No. 229.51 The new maritime boundaries were duly 
charted in the corresponding maps52 and recognized to be in place as of 
the date on which the 1970 treaty entered into force.53 
However, mostly fueled by scientific and technological developments, 
the expansionist trend initiated by developing coastal states in the early 
1950s did not stop with the enlargement of the width of the territorial sea 
out to twelve nautical miles. These states continued to further advance 
their interests for larger and bolder maritime claims over the waters, the 
submarine areas and the subsoil of the continental shelves, and even for 
the creation of novel maritime spaces such as the seabed and ocean floor 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction54 and the exclusive economic 
zone of 200 nautical miles. 
From a regional Latin American movement these maritime claims 
were successfully transplanted to Africa and Asia to be finally placed in 
the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations in the late 
1960s. Considering the global importance of these claims, the United 
Nations agreed to convoke the Third U.N. Conference of the Law of the 
Sea and, at the end of its sessions, this multilateral conference produced 
 
Notes signed in Mexico City on December 18 and 21, 1970. The corresponding maps are 
reproduced in VARGAS, MEXICO AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 35 at 122–23. 
 48. See Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences, supra note 34, at art. 5, 
para. B. 
 49. See id. at art. 5, paras. A–B 
 50. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 
U.N.T.S. 205. 
 51. Minutes Between the United States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC No. 
229, INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min229.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2012). 
 52. VARGAS, MEXICO AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 36, at 122–23. 
 53. The 1970 Treaty entered into force on April 18, 1972. Treaty to Resolve 
Pending Boundary Differences, supra note 34. 
 54. G.A. Dec. 25/2749(XXV), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2749(XXV) (Dec. 17, 
1970). The United Nations formally declared that the seabed and ocean floor beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction is the “common heritage of mankind.” Id. This submarine 
area was recognized as the “International Seabed Area” in Part XI of the 1982 
Convention. U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/PV.1933 (Dec. 17, 1970). 
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the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed by 117 
states at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982.55 
The new maritime spaces created by this Convention, in particular the 
exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles (and its legal implications to 
the continental shelf and the international seabed area) required Mexico 
and the United States to engage in diplomatic negotiations to now delimit 
the continental shelf and the overlapping claims of jurisdiction resulting 
from the establishment of the respective 200-nautical-mile zones in the 
Gulf of Mexico and in the Pacific Ocean. 
2.  Treaty on Maritime Boundaries Between the United States                        
of America and the United Mexican States,                                                 
Signed at Mexico City on May 4, 1978 
As indicated by President Carter, the Treaty on Maritime Boundaries 
between the U.S and Mexico56 is necessary to delimit the continental 
shelf and overlapping claims of jurisdiction resulting from the establishing 
of a 200-nautical-mile fishery conservation zone off the coasts of the 
United States in accordance with the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976 and the exclusive economic zone of 200 
nautical miles established by Mexico in 1976. 
This treaty establishes the maritime boundary between the United 
States and Mexico for the area between twelve and two hundred nautical 
miles off the coasts of the two countries in the Pacific Ocean and the 
Gulf of Mexico.57 Regarding maritime matters, this treaty also supplements 
the 1970 treaty which established the maritime boundaries out to twelve 
nautical miles off the respective coasts. 
According to the United States, this treaty served three purposes: first, 
it was in the U.S. interest to sign it; second, it was to facilitate  law 
enforcement activities and to provide for certainty in resources development 
 
 55. The final text of the Convention was reproduced as U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 
(Oct. 7, 1982). On December 10, 1982, the date the Convention was opened for 
signature, 117 States and two other entities became signatories. 
 56. Treaty on Maritime Boundaries Between the United Mexican States and the 
United States of America, DELIMITATION TREATIES INFOBASE, May 4, 1978, http://www. 
un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/MEX-USA 
1978MB.PDF (accessed July 27, 2012). 
 57. See Letter of Submittal from Cyrus Vance, Sec’y of State, to Jimmy Carter, 
President of the U.S. (Dec. 27, 1978), in THREE TREATIES ESTABLISHING MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, VENEZUELA AND CUBA, S. EXEC. 
DOC. NO. 38-755 O, at 1–6 (96th Cong., 1st Sess.1979) (hereinafter THREE TREATIES). 
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activities; and third, it was consistent with the “U.S. interpretation of 
international law that maritime boundaries are to be established by 
agreement in accordance with equitable principles in the light of relevant 
geographical circumstances.”58 
At that time, Mexico had already delimited a 200-nautical-mile exclusive 
economic zone in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Pacific Ocean59 by 
means of a decree that amended its Political Constitution and added a 
new paragraph to its Article 27.60 The legal nature and characteristics of 
this zone were later detailed in the Reglamentary Act of February 13, 
1976.61  The corresponding outer boundaries of this zone, formed by a 
series of arcs that joined specific points as established by geodetic lines, 
are described by the Decree of June 7, 1976.62 
In 1976, the United States fishery zone63 extending out to 200 nautical 
miles. and the treaty with neighboring Mexico was required for two 
reasons: first, to avoid the overlapping of extensive maritime claims by 
the U.S. and Mexico; and second, “to establish and recognize their 
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Pacific Ocean,” as 
indicated by Article I of the Treaty. As is customary for these types of 
delimitations, the respective boundaries were established by geodetic 
lines connecting appropriate points identified in the treaty by specific 
coordinates. 
 
 58. See Letter of Transmittal from Jimmy Carter, President of the U.S., to Cyrus 
Vance, Sec’y of State (Jan. 19, 1978), in THREE TREATIES, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 38-755 O, 
at III (96th Cong., 1st Sess.1979). 
 59. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see VARGAS, MEXICO AND THE LAW OF 
THE SEA, supra note 36, at 193–243. 
 60. The text of this decree is reproduced in JORGE A. VARGAS, LA ZONA 
ECONÓMICA EXCLUSIVA DE MÉXICO 59–60 (1980). The area of Mexico’s EEZ (excluding 
its Territorial sea) totals 584,208.47 square miles in the Pacific Ocean and 186,875.47 
square miles in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean for a total of 771,083.94 square miles. 
VARGAS, MEXICO AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 36, at 200. 
 61. The Reglamentary Act to Paragraph Eight of Article 27 of the Political 
Constitution was published in the D.O. of February 13, 1976. For the text of this decree, 
see VARGAS, supra note 60, at 61–63. For legal and diplomatic reasons, this decree 
imposed a vacatio legis to make it enter into force 120 days after its publication, in other 
words, on June 6, 1976, exactly one month after the ending of the Fourth Session of 
UNCLOS III, when the Informal Revised Negotiating Text (IRNT) was released. This 
vacatio legis also applied to the decree that added the eighth paragraph to Article 27 of 
the Political Constitution. 
 62. The text of this decree is also reproduced in VARGAS, supra note 60, at 65–74. 
 63. See Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 
331–33 (1976) (President Gerald C. Ford signed this law into Act on April 13, 1976.); 
see also Fishery Conservation Zone, 42 Fed. Reg., 12,937 (Mar. 7, 1977); Robert W. 
Smith, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States, 71 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 395, 395–
410 (1981) (“[T]he area enclosed by this extension of maritime jurisdiction includes . . . 
2,222,000 square nautical miles off the coasts of the fifty states and 885 square nautical 
miles off the coasts of the possessions and commonwealth . . . .”). 
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Since these countries had already agreed on maritime boundaries 
seaward to a distance of twelve nautical miles by the Treaty of November 
23, 1970, the U.S. Department of State reported that discussions between 
officials of both governments, held in the Spring of 1976, led to an 
Exchange of Notes on November 24, 1976, establishing “provisional 
maritime boundaries in accordance with equitable principles.”64 
a.  The Exchange of Notes Establishing ProvisionalMaritime  
Boundaries Between Both Countries of                                                    
November 24, 1976 
Mark B. Feldman and David Colson, U.S. Department of State officials 
who negotiated the agreement with Mexico, reported that this agreement 
effected by means of a diplomatic Exchange of Notes  “was not cast in 
the form of a treaty at that time because the parties wanted to consider 
whether further technical work was necessary to establish a scientifically 
more precise boundary. Later . . . both Governments concluded that the 
coordinates contained in the agreement . . . were suitable for a permanent 
boundary, and a treaty using these coordinates was signed on May 4, 
1978.”65 
However, the U.S. Senate never gave its advice and consent to this 
international instrument which remained for years in legal limbo. 
Notwithstanding this, the “provisional maritime boundaries” established 
by the Exchange of Notes were simply reproduced and incorporated in 
toto in the subsequent Treaty of May 4, 1978.66 
It should be clarified that in a diplomatic note dated November 24, 
1976 sent by Dr. Alfonso García Robles, then Mexican Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, to the U.S. Ambassador Joseph John Jova, it was agreed 
that the “provisional boundaries” recognized by both countries did not 
apply to the continental shelf. The Mexican note read in part: 
 
 64. See Letter of Submittal from Cyrus Vance, Sec’y of State, to Jimmy Carter, 
President of the U.S. (Dec. 27, 1978), in THREE TREATIES, supra note 57, at 1; see also 
Exchange of Notes Effecting Agreement on the Provisional Maritime Boundary, U.S.-
Mex., Nov. 26, 1976, T.I.A.S. 8805. 
 65. See Feldman & Colson, supra note 11, at 740. 
 66. See Vargas, Mexico’s Legal Regime, supra note 10, at 227 (explaining that 
provisional boundaries recognized by both countries in 1976 did not apply to the 
continental shelf or to the submarine area beyond twelve nautical miles, as asserted by 
Dr. Alfonso García Robles, Mexico’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs, per diplomatic note 
of Nov. 24, 1976); see also Vargas, The Gulf of Mexico: A Binational Lake Shared by 
the U.S. and Mexico: A Proposal, 9 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 459, 459–82 (1996). 
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I take the liberty of pointing out that our two countries have not yet delimited 
their respective continental shelves beyond twelve nautical miles seaward from the 
respective coasts, and that the present arrangement with respect to maritime 
boundaries, based on the Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences 
and Maintain the Rio Grande and the Colorado River as the International 
Boundary, concluded in 1970, only extends to the maritime boundary to 12 
nautical miles.67 
This meant that, even with the new Treaty of 1978, the bilateral maritime 
boundaries between both countries remained inconclusive. In other 
words, the recently formalized boundaries in the 1978 Treaty were 
simply incomplete because the presence of a submarine oil and gas 
reservoir contiguous to the already established maritime boundary, both 
in the Pacific Ocean but especially in the Gulf of Mexico, was located in 
the submarine continental shelf; a submarine area whose maritime 
boundaries had not been negotiated yet, as explicitly pointed out to the 
United States by Dr. García Robles. 
Therefore, the necessity of having to reach an agreement on the 
continental shelf and other submarine areas in the central and deepest 
portion of the Gulf of Mexico finally moved the United States to negotiate 
and sign the maritime delimitation agreement contained in the 1978 
Treaty with Mexico. 
b.  The Operative Part of the 1978 Treaty 
The operative portion of the 1978 Treaty is quite brief and consists of 
only four articles. Article I sets out the specific geographic coordinates 
that define the maritime boundary established in the treaty. According to 
the U.S. Department of State, the maritime boundaries consist of three 
segments: 
(1) In the western Gulf of Mexico extending eastward from the international 
boundary separating Texas from Mexico; (2) in the eastern Gulf of Mexico, 
where the 200-nautical-mile zones developed from the Louisiana coast and 
islands off the Yucatan coast overlap; and, (3) in the Pacific Ocean, extending 
westward from the international boundary separating California from Mexico. 
In the western Gulf of Mexico, the maritime boundary begins at the terminus of 
the twelve nautical mile boundary established by the 1970 Treaty and extends 
through two turning points and then to a point which is 200 nautical miles from 
the coasts of the two countries. 
In the eastern Gulf of Mexico the maritime boundary begins at the western most 
point at which the 200 nautical mile zones off the Louisiana and Yucatan coasts 
 
 67. Exchange of Notes Effecting Agreement on the Provisional Maritime Boundary, 
U.S.-Mex., Nov. 24, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 197 (emphasis added); see also Vargas, supra note 
10, at 227. 
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overlap, continues through a turning point, and terminates at the easternmost 
point at which the 200 nautical mile zones overlap. 
In the Pacific Ocean the maritime boundary begins at the terminus of 
the twelve nautical mile boundary established by the 1970 Treaty and 
extends through two turning points and then to a point, which is 200 
nautical miles from the coasts of the two countries (See Appendix 4). 
The boundaries are geodetic lines which connect these points. The 
coordinates are determined with reference to the 1927 North American 
Datum and the Clarke 1866 ellipsoid. 
The U.S. Department of State made an explicit reference to underline 
that the maritime boundaries described in this Article “are negotiated 
boundaries developed on the basis of (a) equitable principles in light of 
the relevant geographical circumstances, including the delimitation 
principles of the 1958 U.N. Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
(to which the U.S. and Mexico are parties); (b) the criteria set forth by 
the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases; and (c) the principles utilized in determining the twelve nautical 
mile maritime boundaries under the 1970 Treaty. The application of 
these principles to the factual circumstances off the coasts of the United 
States and Mexico resulted in agreement on the maritime boundaries 
described in Article I.”68 (See Appendix 4.) 
Article II describes the legal effect of the maritime boundaries, providing 
that “neither country shall claim or exercise for any purpose sovereign 
rights or jurisdiction over the waters or seabed and subsoil on the other 
country’s side of the maritime boundary.”69 Although drafted in a rather 
obscure or even cryptic language, this phrase apparently alludes to the 
possibility that the maritime boundaries established, or the ostensible 
gaps where no boundary was agreed upon, may be bisecting a possible 
transboundary hydrocarbon reservoir located in the Gulf of Mexico and 
in the Pacific Ocean. One interpretation of this apparently innocuous 
language may be that if such a transboundary hydrocarbon (or natural 
gas) reservoir did exist, neither the United States nor Mexico may claim 
or exercise sovereign rights or jurisdiction over said reservoir. 
When this treaty was being negotiated (first in 1976 and later in 1978) 
there was no certainty at that time, based on geological and other scientific 
 
 68. See Letter of Submittal from Cyrus Vance, Sec’y of State, to Jimmy Carter, 
President of the U.S. (Dec. 27, 1978), in THREE TREATIES, supra note 57, at 2. 
 69. Id. 
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data, of the existence of such a transboundary reservoir either in the Gulf 
of Mexico or in the Pacific. To avoid any possibility that Mexico, or 
more likely the United States (given its technological advancement in 
the exploration and exploitation of submarine reservoirs in ultra-deep 
waters), would make any attempt to extract oil or natural gas from the 
other side of the maritime boundary, both parties explicitly added this 
language to Article II of this treaty to avoid or reject such claims, or the 
possible exercise of sovereignty rights over natural resources in that 
submarine area. 
While this treaty was being negotiated, a number of institutions and 
individuals in Mexico (including members of the Senate) expressed serious 
concerns that if a transfrontier hydrocarbon reservoir existed where the 
maritime boundaries had been established, U.S. oil companies appeared 
to be already poised to immediately proceed to commercially exploit 
said the reservoir, tapping its mineral resources from the U.S. side of the 
boundary. However, from a legal viewpoint, because said resources were 
to be extracted from a “transfrontier hydrocarbon reservoir,” American 
companies would be tapping not only from U.S. resources but also from 
Mexican resources, thus not disregarding or circumventing the maritime 
boundaries but clearly breaching the purpose of the treaty.70 At that time, 
the most vigorous warnings in Mexico were made by Senator José Angel 
Conchello (Partido Acción Nacional or PAN).71 
Article III clarifies that the sole purpose of the treaty is to establish the 
location of the maritime boundaries between the two countries without 
affecting or prejudicing either country=s position with respect to any 
other marine space, or of sovereign rights or jurisdiction for any other 
purpose. This disclaimer is commonly included in these kinds of treaties, 
especially considering that in this case the United States and Mexico 
maintained different legal positions at that time (i) on the breadth of the 
 
 70. See Juan E. Pardinas, La Soberanía, la Naturaleza y el Calendario  
[Sovereignty, Nature and the Calendar], in CRUZANDO LÍMITES: MÉXICO ANTE LOS 
DESAFÍOS DE SUS YACIMIENTOS TRANSFRONTERIZOS 14–23 (David Enriquez et al. eds., 
2007); David Enríquez, Cuando la Razón Tapona los Popotes [When Reason Clogs Up 
the Straws], in CRUZANDO LÍMITES: MÉXICO ANTE LOS DESAFÍOS DE SUS YACIMIENTOS 
TRANSFRONTERIZOS 50–70. (David Enriquez et al. eds., 2007). 
 71. See Editorial, Agujero de la Dona, Extraña Cesión a Estados Unidos: ¿A 
cambio de que? [The Doughnut Hole, Strange Cession to the United States], SIEMPRE, 
June 8, 2000, at 4–5. Senator Conchello is also attributed with having coined the Spanish 
expression “Efecto Popote” (“Straw Effect”) to indicate that the U.S. was technologically able 
to “suck up” Mexico’s oil and natural gas from the U.S. side of the boundary by utilizing 
a submarine horizontal drilling technology in the Gulf of Mexico based on the U.S.-
Mexico Treaty on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Western Gulf of 
Mexico of June 9, 2000. 
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territorial sea;72 (ii) the nature of the jurisdiction exercised within the 200 
nautical mile zone;73 and (iii) the nature of the submarine area beyond 200 
nautical miles,74 declared to be the “common heritage of humankind” by 
the United Nations General Assembly in 1967.75 
Article IV provided that the treaty was to enter into force on the date 
of exchange of instruments of ratification.76 
Notwithstanding that the central purpose of this treaty was to establish 
clear and explicit boundaries between these two states, the 1978 bilateral 
agreement did not adhere to this fundamental principle. In the central 
and deepest portion of the Gulf of Mexico, as depicted in the corresponding 
map (see Appendix 4), the agreed maritime boundary was formed by 
two separate but interrupted lines, leaving an undefined gap between 
them. For purposes of the treaty, the boundaries in this Gulf consisted of 
two separate boundary lines between the “Western” and the “Eastern” Gulf 
of Mexico, leaving between them a gap of some 129 miles. However, as 
indicated below by Mr. Feldman, the resulting “gaps” were due to the 
fact that at that time the international community represented at the 
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea had not agreed yet on a 
legal definition of the outer edge of the continental margin. 
In a prepared statement submitted to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the U.S. Senate on June 30, 1980, Mark B. Feldman, Deputy 
Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State said: 
  
 
 72. At that time, the United States had a three nautical mile territorial sea in contrast 
to Mexico’s 12 n.m. territorial sea. 
 73. The U.S. had a 200 n.m. Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
(exercising jurisdiction over living resources only) whereas Mexico had established an 
Exclusive economic zone of 200 n.m. (exercising sovereignty rights over both living and 
mineral resources). However, the U.S. claimed sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting the resources of the continental shelf pursuant to the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (as 
amended). See Feldman & Colson, supra note 11, at 730. 
 74. For the United States, the submarine area beyond 200 n.m. was considered to 
be the high seas; for Mexico, the superjacent waters were recognized as the high seas but 
the seabed and ocean floor was considered a part of the Common heritage of humankind, 
later defined as the “International Seabed Area” by Part XI of the 1982 U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. 
 75. See G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. DOC. A/8097 (Dec. 
17, 1970). 
 76. See Letter of Submittal from Cyrus Vance, Sec’y of State, to Jimmy Carter, 
President of the U.S. (Dec. 27, 1978), in THREE TREATIES, supra note 57, at 3. 
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In the central Gulf of Mexico there is a reach of waters approximately 129 
nautical miles in length where there is no fisheries boundary between the two 
countries. In this area the coasts of the two countries opposite each other are 
more than 400 nautical miles apart, so our fisheries zones do not overlap. We 
have not drawn a continental shelf boundary in this area. . . because the limit of 
the outer edge of the continental margin is presently a matter under active 
negotiation at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III).77 
From a Mexican perspective,78 the absence of the submarine boundary in 
the deepest area where considerable mineral resources were believed to 
exist, was wrongly interpreted by certain politicians and members of the 
press in Mexico as a strategy by the United States to take advantage of 
its technological prowess not only to explore that submarine area but 
also to be able to exploit said resources. Later on, this Mexican perception 
became stronger based on the declarations made by Dr. Hollis Hedberg 
during the ratification proceedings of the U. S. Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations regarding this treaty with Mexico.79 
i.  Dr. Hedberg Raises Objections to the 1978 Treaty 
When the U.S. Senate Committee took testimony from a number of 
specialists on this matter, Dr. Hollis Hedberg, former Executive of the 
Gulf Oil Corporation, past President of the Geological Society of America 
and Professor emeritus in Geology at Princeton University, made a 
number of objections to the Mexican Treaty and opposed its ratification 
by the Senate based on three arguments: 
a.  The Methodology Used in the Treaty to Delimit the                        
Boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico was Flawed 
Dr. Hedberg strongly opposed the use of a Mexican reef (Arrecife 
Alacrán, off the Yucatan peninsula) as a base point to delimit the outer 
boundary of the 200 n.m. zone. Instead of this methodology, he proposed 
that the boundary in the Gulf should have been calculated based on the 
continental slope, an unprecedented practice completely out of sync with 
 
 77. THREE TREATIES ESTABLISHING MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND MEXICO, VENEZUELA AND CUBA, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 96-49, at 11 (1980) 
(hereinafter THREE TREATIES 2). 
 78. See generally supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Statement of Hollis Hedberg, THREE TREATIES, supra note 57, at 28–33 
[hereinafter Hedberg’s Statement]. Dr. Hedberg wrote: “Island dependencies situated on 
continental shelves and slopes should not control national boundaries beyond the base of 
the continental slope.” Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
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both international practice and the then undergoing negotiations of the 
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea.80 
Dr. Hedberg’s methodology was based on the erroneous premise that 
“[i]sland dependencies situated and continental shelves and slopes should 
not control national boundaries beyond the base of the continental slope.” 
This premise was  excluded from the discussions of UNCLOS III and did 
not appear in any of the several formal drafts that preceded the formulation 
of the final text of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
A number of serious defects marred Dr. Hedberg’s proposal: first, it 
was made without taking into account the diplomatic negotiations already 
conducted between Mexico and the United States; second, it disregarded 
the multilateral negotiations at UNCLOS III, as reflected in the latest 
UN Draft Treaty produced in 1980; and, third, it advanced a maritime 
boundary methodology that was Dr. Hedberg’s own personal creation, 
formulated from the confines of an academic ivory tower with no 
relationship to the international practice and the legal principles recognized 
by the majority of the 160 states participating at the sessions of UNCLOS 
III. In fact, these legal principles were recognized by many countries 
(Mexico included) as a part of customary international law principles of 
universal recognition that were in the process of being incorporated into 
the final text of the law of the sea treaty being formulated by the law of 
the sea conference. 
b.  Dr. Hedberg Objected to the Use of Mexican Islands and Proposed 
That These Islands Should Not Be Used for the Demarcation                               
of the Maritime Boundaries81 
In the drawing of the maritime boundaries, both the United States and 
Mexico took advantage of the fact that customary and conventional  
international law allow coastal states to use islands as basepoints for the 
drawing of maritime boundaries. As indicated by Mr. Feldman, 
[T]he use of islands as basepoints gives the United States substantial areas in the 
Pacific off the coast of California. In the Pacific, two islands, San Clemente and 
San Nicolas, are used as basepoints and they bring under U.S. jurisdiction about 
18,000 square miles of area, which includes four banks of fisheries importance: 
 
 80. For a rebuttal of Dr. Hedberg’s arguments, see Vargas, supra note 10, at 220–
26.  For a technical explanation, see Smith, supra note 63, at 402–05. 
 81. See Hedberg’s Statement, supra note 79, at 33. 
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Tanner Bank, Cortez Bank, the 40-Mile Bank, and the 60-Mile Bank. In 
addition to fisheries interests, the Pacific also has hydrocarbon potential.82 
Moreover, the use of numerous islands by the United States in six different 
water bodies: the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean 
Sea, the Pacific Ocean, the Bering Sea, and the Chuckchi Sea, used as 
basepoints for the establishment of a U.S. fisheries zone, as allowed by 
international law, gave the U.S. an area enclosed that  “includes 
approximately 2,222,000 square nautical miles off the coasts of the fifty 
states and 885,000 square nautical miles off the coasts of the possessions 
and commonwealth.”83 The use of islands gave the United States the largest 
U.S. fisheries zone in the world at that time. 
However, as recognized by the United States (and many other countries), 
“the proposed boundary lines resulted from using islands as basepoints 
for determining an equidistance line.”84 The use of this method produced 
immediate benefits for both countries, considering that Mexico and the 
United States used islands located in the Gulf of Mexico and in the 
Pacific as basepoints for the drawing of the boundary.85 In addition, the 
use of islands follows the precedent already established by the 1970 
Treaty between the United States and Mexico, as asserted by Mr. Feldman.86 
Contrary to Dr. Hedberg’s ideas, international law has traditionally 
recognized islands as basepoints for maritime delimitation purposes. This 
international practice goes back as early as the 1958 U.N. Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (Article 10, 
to which the United States and Mexico were parties at that time), and the 
final text of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (Articles. 
13 and 121, paragraph 2). 
 
 82. Feldman & Colson, supra note 11, at 744. 
 83. See Smith, supra note 63, at 395, 398 (listing the following islands: American 
Samoa, Guam, Howland and Baker Islands, Jarvis Island, Midway Island, Northern 
Marianas, Palmyra Island, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands and Wake Island). Later on, the 
200 n.m. fisheries zones were changed into a U.S. 200 n.m. exclusive economic zone. 
 84. See Feldman & Colson, supra note 11, at 744. On this point, in his Prepared 
Statement, Mr. Feldman said, “[T]he use of islands as basepoints gives the United States 
substantial areas in the Pacific off the coast of California. In the Pacific, two islands, San 
Clemente and San Nicolas, are used as basepoints and they bring under U.S. jurisdiction 
about 18,000 square miles of area, which includes four banks of fisheries importance: 
Tanner Bank, Cortez Bank, the 40-Mile Bank, and the 60-Mile Bank. In addition to 
fisheries interests, the Pacific area also has hydrocarbon potential.” See THREE TREATIES 
2, supra note 77, at 7. 
 85. With respect to the use of islands as basepoints for maritime delimitation 
purposes, see the authoritative and supporting position of Dr. Robert W. Smith, Chief of 
the Marine Boundary and Resources Division, Office of The Geographer, U.S. Department 
of State.  Smith, supra note 63, at 404–05. 
 86. See THREE TREATIES 2, supra note 77, at 11. 
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c.  The Draft Treaty Would Give Mexico a Most Promising                   
Petroleum Prospective Submarine Acreage 
Dr. Hedberg asserted that the Draft Treaty “would needlessly lose to 
the United States almost all of the northwestern deep water part of the 
Gulf of Mexico (about 25,000 square miles) which would comprise some of 
the most promising, although very deep-water, petroleum prospective 
acreage off the U.S. coast anywhere,” adding : 
The practical importance of ocean floor boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico is 
highlighted by the fact that the entire Gulf of Mexico basin is prospective 
petroleum territory. The prolific petroleum production of the Gulf region, both 
in the United States and in Mexico, has to date come largely from the landward 
limb of the huge semicircular geocycline of thick sediments whose axis lies 
some distance offshore paralleling the periphery of the Gulf. However, the 
undrilled seaward limb of this sediment-filled through, raising basinward under 
the deep water beyond the slope, may also be abundantly petroliferous. . . The 
northwestern part of the central Gulf which we appear to be preparing to 
relinquish (some 25,000 square miles) could be by far the most promising deep-
water petroleum territory to which the United States rightfully has claim. 
Anyone recommending ratification of the Mexican-United States draft treaty is 
recommending the needless giving away of more than a million acres of our 
most promising off-shore petroleum territory at a time when domestic 
petroleum resources are of paramount importance to this country.87 
Although the U.S.-Mexico Treaty on Maritime Boundaries was reported 
favorably on August 5, 1980 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,88 
it was withdrawn from consideration on the Senate floor on September 
16, 1980, as a result of the statement and objections made by Dr. Hedberg 
in calculating the maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico. Since 
some concern was voiced by Senators Zorinsky and Javits regarding the 
legal basis for establishing maritime boundaries on a provisional basis 
by executive agreement (i.e., the Agreement effected with Mexico through a 
diplomatic Exchange of Notes on November 24, 197689), it was determined 
that said Agreement “remained provisionally in effect pending fina l 
 
 87. See Hedberg’s Statement, supra note 79, at 33. 
 88. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S.-MEXICO TREATY ON MARITIME BOUNDARIES, S. 
EXEC. DOC. NO. 105-4, at 1 (1st Sess. 1997) [hereinafter U.S.-MEXICO TREATY ON MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES]. 
 89. Regarding the Exchange of Notes of 1976, see supra note 67 and the corresponding 
text. 
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determination by treaty of the Maritime Boundaries between the two 
countries off both coasts.”90 
In October of 1997, the Committee favorably recommended the treaty 
for Senate advice and consent, noting that “the untapped reserves of 
crude oil and natural gas in the Gulf of Mexico along the 200 nautical 
mile boundary and the technological advances that have made it more 
likely that U.S. companies will recover these oil and gas deposits. The 
Department of the Interior was already receiving bids for exploration in 
this area and several new drilling vessels capable of operating in water 
depths of up to 10,000 feet were already under construction.”91 
Thus, the U.S. Senate finally gave its advice and consent to the ratification 
of the 1978 Treaty on Maritime Boundaries between the United States of 
America and Mexico in October of 1997, almost twenty years after it 
was signed at Mexico City on May 4, 1978,92 approving international 
boundaries for the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific that had been negotiated 
and agreed upon by both countries in the Exchange of Notes that took 
effect since November 24, 1976. 
3.  Treaty with Mexico on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in 
the Western Gulf of Mexico Beyond 200 Nautical Miles,                           
Signed at Washington, D.C. on June 9, 2000 
As indicated in the letter that President William J. Clinton addressed 
to the U.S. Senate seeking its advice and consent, “the purpose of this 
treaty was to establish a continental shelf boundary in the western Gulf 
of Mexico beyond the outer limits of the two countries’ exclusive economic 
zones where those limits do not overlap. The approximately 135-nautical 
mile continental shelf boundary defines the limit within which the United 
States and Mexico may exercise continental shelf jurisdiction, particularly 
oil and gas exploration and exploitation.”93 
At the treaty’s signing ceremony between U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright and the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs Rosario 
Green, it was disclosed that both countries started negotiating the 2000 
 
 90. See Miguel Angel González Felix, La Delimitación de la Frontera Marítima 
en el Golfo de México [The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of 
Mexico], LOS ESPACIOS MARÍTIMOS Y SU DELIMINACIÓN [MARITIME SPACES AND THEIR 
DELIMITATION] 221–41 (Secretaría de Energía, México ed., 1999). 
 91. See U.S.-MEXICO TREATY ON MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 88, at 5. 
 92. Id. at 6. 
 93. See Letter of Transmittal of the Treaty on the Delimitation of Continental Shelf 
from the President of the United States to the United States Senate, July 27, 2000, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 106-39, at iii (2000) [hereinafter Letter of Transmittal of the Treaty on 
the Delimitation of Continental Shelf]. Originally, the length of the continental shelf 
boundary was estimated to be of 129 nautical miles. 
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Treaty since early 1998 to reach agreement on the only maritime boundary 
that was still left undefined between both countries at that time. 
Basically, the 2000 Treaty94 defines the limits within which each Party 
may exercise its sovereign rights over the seabed and the subsoil of the 
continental shelf in a submarine area located in the western Gulf of Mexico, 
beyond the limits of their respective exclusive economic zones extending 
out to 200 nautical miles (in an area known as the “Western Gap”) for 
the purpose of exploring the continental shelf and exploiting its natural 
resources.95 Under international law, and according to the 1982 U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states exercise over the 
continental shelf “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and 
exploiting its natural resources.”96 
When the U.S. Senate was receiving testimony regarding the 1978 
Treaty as part of the ratification proceedings, Dr. Hedberg, former 
Executive of the Gulf Oil Corporation, said that “the northwestern part of 
the central Gulf (located in the Area) (some 25,000 square miles (equivalent 
to more than a million acres)) could be by far the most promising deep-
water petroleum territory to which the United States rightfully has claim.”97 
This statement generated tremendous interest among the powerful oil 
industry (including the American Association of Petroleum Geologists98), 
who immediately started lobbing to stop the U.S. Senate from giving its 
advice and consent to the 1978 Treaty.99 The pressure was so intense and 
successful that said Treaty was withdrawn from consideration on the 
 
 94. Treaty on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Western Gulf of 
Mexico Beyond 200 Nautical Miles, U.S.-Mex., June 9, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 01-117, 2143 
U.N.T.S. 417; Letter of Transmittal of the Treaty on the Delimitation of Continental 
Shelf, supra note 93, at v-viii. 
 95. Letter of Transmittal of the Treaty on the Delimitation of Continental Shelf, 
supra note 93, at v. 
 96. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 77, para. 1, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 97. See Hedberg’s Statement, supra note 79 and the accompanying text.   
 98. See David Applegate, Doughnut Holes in the Gulf of Mexico, 5 BOUNDARY  & 
SECURITY BULL. 71, 72 (1997). 
 99. In Mexico, it was reported that Mexico had been engaged in “secret  
negotiations” with the United States to modify the submarine maritime boundaries in the 
Gulf of Mexico to the benefit of the United States, as a result of pressure exercised by 
the United States oil industry. It is alleged that Mexico ended up losing a substantial 
submarine area of the Western Gap, including the “Sigsbee Escarpment,” which is rich 
in mineral resources.  See FABIO BARBOSA, EL PETROLEO DE LOS HOYOS DE DONA [THE 
OIL IN THE DOUGHNUT HOLES] 29–49 (2003). 
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Senate floor on September 16, 1980, and did not receive the advice and 
consent of the Senate until seventeen years later, on October of 1997. 
Accordingly, to reach agreement with Mexico on the precise maritime 
boundary of the submarine continental shelf in the central and deepest 
part in the middle of the “Western Gap,” in a submarine area beyond 200 
nautical miles known to have rich mineral deposits, was of paramount 
importance for both the United States and Mexico, especially when one 
considers that the maritime boundary of the submarine continental shelf 
to be drawn in that part of the Gulf was going to bisect a transboundary 
hydrocarbon reservoir to be shared by both countries. 
Based on the geological, geophysical and other scientific studies 
previously conducted,100 both parties agreed that the “Western Gap” 
comprised a total area of “approximately 5,092 square nautical miles 
(17,467 square kilometers), an area slightly smaller that the state of New 
Jersey. The agreed submarine maritime boundary divided the continental 
shelf in the “Western Gap” in the following manner: the United States 
received 1,913 square nautical miles (6,562 square kilometers) or 38% 
of the total area; and Mexico received 3,179 square nautical miles (10,905 
square kilometers) or 62% of the total area. 
a.  Treaty Negotiations Between Mexico and the United States 
It was the United States who took the initiative of proposing to Mexico, 
in the early years of the 1990’s, the maritime delimitation of the continental 
shelf boundary in the Western and Eastern Gaps of the Gulf of Mexico, 
according to Lic. Jorge Palacios Treviño, who served as Adviser to the 
Legal Department of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE).101 
Mexico was “categoric”102 in answering to the United States that it 
would not engage in such negotiations until the day the U.S. Senate would 
give its advice and consent to the 1978 Treaty. In the early 1970’s, the 
Mexican government learned that the Department of the Interior was 
auctioning submarine tracts in the continental shelf of the Western Gulf 
 
 100. In the United States, the Department of the Interior had already auctioned 
numerous lots close to the boundary, and U.S. companies conducted marine scientific 
investigations to ascertain the location and nature of the reservoirs. Mexico hired the 
services of a Canadian company “to study the sediments and resources” of the Western 
Cap.  See id. at 40–49. 
 101. See JORGE PALACIOS TREVIÑO, LA DEFENSA DEL PETRÓLEO MEXICANO AL 
TRAZARSE LA FRONTERA SUBMARINA CON ESTADOS UNIDOS [DEFENSE OF THE MEXICAN 
OIL IN THE DRAWING OF THE SUBMARINE BOUNDARY WITH THE UNITED STATES] 83 
(2003). This commentary closely adheres to the narrative in this book. 
 102. Press Bulletin B-361, issued by the Secretary of Exterior Relations (Secretaría 
de Relaciones Exteriores) on Nov. 18, 1997, stated: “The answer of the government of 
Mexico was categoric in the sense that [the United States] first had to ratify the 1978 
Treaty of Maritime Boundaries.”  Id. at 86–88. 
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of Mexico in an area that would correspond to the United States, if that 
area were to be divided by the equidistance method. On May 21, 1997, 
the SRE submitted a note to the U.S. Department of State suggesting 
that the auctioning of the tracts by the Department of the Interior “would 
be in violation of international law and this would run contrary to 
resolving the matter in a just and equitable manner.”103 
Furthermore, in a subsequent diplomatic note,104 SRE indicated that 
“pursuant to conventional and customary international law, States are under 
the obligation of delimiting the continental shelf through a [bilateral] 
agreement and, therefore, if no [maritime delimitation] is agreed bilaterally, 
Mexico would object any attempt by the United States of acquiring any 
submarine areas by unilateral possession (reivindicación); the adjudication 
of licences for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons; or the 
possible acquisition of rights by U.S. private companies in the [submarine] 
areas not yet delimited.”105 
As a consequence of these notes, the American oil companies proceeded 
to request the U.S. Senate to give its advice and consent to the 1978 
Treaty.106 The Senate, as discussed earlier, finally ratified the Treaty on 
October 23, 1997, during President Zedillo’s visit to Washington, D.C., 
on November 13, 1997.107 
To clarify newspaper articles printed in Mexico City regarding the 
Treaty and the delimitation of maritime boundaries, the Secretariat of 
Foreign Affairs (SRE) issued the following press release: 
The sovereignty of Mexico over its natural resources has been defended and no 
agreement has been negotiated with the United States on maritime boundaries. 
During President Zedillo’s working visit to Washington, D.C. . . . on November 
13 . . . the Exchange of  Instruments of Ratification with the United States [took 
place regarding the 1978 Treaty]. Said Treaty was approved by the Mexican 
Senate [on November 28, 1978]. 
On its part, the U.S. Senate, decided to leave pending the approval of the Treaty 
because at that time it considered even doubtful the [possible] delimitation of 
the maritime boundary drawn in the Gulf of Mexico, 200 miles from the reefs 
Alacrán, Arenas and Cayo Arenas belonging to Mexico and located north of the 
 
 103. Diplomatic Note from the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (May 21, 1997), 
cited in PALACIOS TREVIÑO, supra note 101, at 84. 
 104. Diplomatic Note from the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (July 25, 1997), 
cited in PALACIOS TREVIÑO, supra note 101. 
 105. PALACIOS TREVIÑO, supra note 101, at 84–85. 
 106. See Michael M. Phillips, Gulf of Mexico Dispute Stymies Drilling. U.S. Agencies 
Want to Set Boundary with Mexico for Oil and Gas Bounty, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1999. 
 107. See PALACIOS TREVIÑO, supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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Yucatán peninsula and of the states of Tabasco and Campeche. For Mexico, it 
was of vital importance that the original drawing of the maritime boundary 
agreed in the 1978 Treaty be respected because of the existence [in that area] of 
important natural resources, including hydrocarbons, located within its 
Exclusive economic zone, namely, within the 200 nautical miles from its coasts 
.  .  .  . 
. . . . . 
The ratification of the Treaty took place according to its original text, such as it 
was approved by the Senate of the Republic in 1978, with no modification 
whatsoever. The negotiation with the United States and with the U.N. 
[International Seabed] Authority that administers the International Seabed Area 
regarding the delimitation of the so-called “Western and Eastern doughnuts in 
the center of the Gulf of Mexico” shall be initiated after concluding a series of 
technical studies which are still undergoing. 
As of this moment, the government of Mexico has no knowledge that any foreign 
oil company had attempted to drill and even less to claim rights over the 
[submarine] areas located within the “Western doughnut.” The government of 
Mexico shall continue to give maximum priority to the defense of its 
sovereignty over those natural resources for the [benefit of the] country and for 
its future generations.108 
Lic. Palacios Treviño adds that Mexico accepted a new U.S. proposal to 
delimit only the continental shelf in the western zone of the Gulf of Mexico, 
and he speculates that this proposal was made because the continental 
shelf in the eastern zone necessarily involved Cuba, and the United 
States would not appear  interested in negotiating with that country.109 
b.  Operative part of the 2000 Treaty 
The treaty consists of nine articles and two annexes. Article I establishes 
the maritime boundary between the United States and Mexico beyond 200 
nautical miles by means of geodetic lines connecting the listed sixteen 
turning and terminal points. In keeping with the methodology used in the 
previous U.S.-Mexico maritime boundary treaties,110 the agreed line 
 
 108. PALACIOS TREVIÑO, supra note 101, at 86–88. 
 109. This author reports that Cuba and the United States periodically extended the 
bilateral agreement they subscribed establishing provisional maritime boundaries 
between these countries. Id. at 88; see also José María Valenzuela Robles Linares, 
Yacimientos Transfronterizos de Hidrocarburos [Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs], 
10 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL [MEX. Y.B. INT’L L.] 353, 353–88 
(2010). 
 110. See Alonso Gómez-Robledo Verduzco, Tratado sobre Delimitación de la 
Plataforma Continental entre México y E.U.A. del 9 de Junio de 2000 [Treaty on the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Mexico and the U.S. of June 9, 2000], 2 
ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL [MEX. Y.B. INT’L L.] 52, 52–71 
(2002). 
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“represents an equidistance line drawn from the respective U.S. and 
Mexican coastal baseline, including the baselines of islands.”111 
Article II sets out the technical parameters of the boundary based on 
the 1983 North American datum (NAD 83) and the International Earth 
Rotation Service’s Terrestrial Reference Frame (ITRF 92), as depicted in 
a map attached to the Treaty as Annex 1. (See Appendix 2). 
Article III reproduces the provision the United States includes in “all 
modern maritime boundary treaties” that, “north of the boundary, Mexico 
will not, and south of the boundary, the United States will not claim or 
exercise for any purpose sovereign rights or jurisdiction over the seabed 
and subsoil.”112 
Articles IV and V contain specific provisions applicable to “reservoirs 
that may extend across the continental shelf boundary” (i.e., Transboundary 
reservoirs) (i) creating a cooperative framework by which the Parties can 
exchange information to help determine the existence of these reservoirs; 
(ii) establishing a “buffer zone” (called “the Area”) which comprises a 
continental shelf area of 1.4 nautical miles on each side of the boundary; 
(iii) requiring each party to facilitate requests from the other party to 
authorize geological and geophysical information “to determine the 
possible presence and distribution of transboundary reservoirs;”     
(iv) obliging each party to notify the other party “if it has knowledge of 
the existence and possible existence and location of transboundary 
reservoirs” and to supply the other a “written summary of their respective 
national laws and regulations pertaining to offshore and gas development;” 
(v) dictating that the parties must  meet periodically during the ten year 
moratorium “for the purpose of identifying, locating, and determining 
the geological and geophysical characteristics of transboundary reservoirs;” 
and (vi) “seek to reach agreement for the efficient and equitable exploitation 
of such transboundary reservoirs;” etc.113 
These two articles address the most important substantive questions of 
the treaty: first, the recognition of the “possible existence of [oil and gas] 
transboundary reservoirs” and the obligation by either party to “notify” 
the existence of said reservoirs to the other party; and second, the 
establishment of a “buffer zone” where parties agreed to a ten-year 
moratorium on petroleum drilling or exploitation. In addition, parties 
 
 111. See Letter of Transmittal of the Treaty on the Delimitation of Continental 
Shelf, supra note 93, at v. 
 112. Id. at vii. 
 113. Id. at vii–viii. 
VARGAS (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2016  4:09 PM 
 
36 
are to meet periodically during the moratorium to exchange information 
regarding said reservoirs. And all of this is to be done within the special 
cooperative framework amicably structured by both parties. The 
establishment of a similar kind of a “cooperative framework” is replicated 
in Article 1 of the subsequent 2012 Agreement regarding the delicate 
matter of “the joint exploration and exploitation of geological hydrocarbon 
structures and reservoirs that extend across the delimitation line.” 
According to Article VI, the parties are required to consult to discuss 
any issue regarding “the interpretation or implementation of the Treaty 
upon a written request” and the parties must solve any dispute concerning 
the Treaty “by negotiation or other peaceful means as may be agreed 
upon by the parties (Article VIII).”114 
Article VII provides that the boundary established in the Treaty “does 
not affect or prejudice in any manner” the positions of either Party regarding 
the extent of internal waters, the territorial sea, the high seas, or of 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction for any other purpose. Article IX provides 
that “the Treaty is subject to ratification and that it will enter into force 
on the date the Parties exchange instruments of ratification.”115 
It should be noted that the language of the 2000 Treaty provides no 
information as to the extension of the total area of the “Western Gap,” 
nor does it describe the submarine areas that resulted as a consequence 
of the establishment of the continental shelf boundary by the 1978 Treaty. 
This boundary was estimated to have a length of 135 nautical miles, 
composed by fifteen segments. Based on a “Background” sheet made 
public by the U.S. Department of State on June 9, 2000, when U.S. 
Secretary Madeline Albright and Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations 
Rosario Green signed the 2000 Treaty during the official visit to 
Washington, D.C. by President William J. Clinton, the following was stated: 
The total area of the “Western Gap” is approximately 5,092 square nautical 
miles (17,467 square kilometers), an area slightly smaller than the state of New 
Jersey. The boundary splits the “Western Gap” continental shelf in the 
following manner: the United States receives 1913 square nautical miles (6,562 
square kilometers) or 38% of the total area; Mexico receives 3,179 square 
nautical miles (10,905 square kilometers) or 62% of the total area.116 
 
 114. Id. at viii. 
 115. Id. The exchange of ratifications took place on January 17, 2000 (entering into 
force on this date), and Mexico published the Treaty in the Diario Oficial de la 
Federación on March 22, 2001. Tratado entre el gobierno de Los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos y el gobierno de Los Estados Unidos de America sobre la delimitacion de la 
plataforma continental en la region occidental del Golfo de Mexico mas alla de las 200 
millas nauticas, U.S.-Mex., Mar. 22, 2001, 570 DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACIÓN [DO] 8. 
 116. Treaty Between Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Mexican States on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
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However, Lic. Palacios Treviño, an advisor to the Legal Department of 
the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE) who served as a member of the 
Mexican delegation who negotiated the 2000 Treaty, has indicated that 
“based on the equidistance method agreed by Mexico, out of the total 
submarine area of the Western Gap, 10,620 square kilometers correspond 
to Mexico (equivalent to 61.78% of the total submarine area) and 6,570 
square kilometers to the United States (equivalent to 38.22%).117 
The Treaty with Mexico on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
in the Western Gulf of Mexico beyond 200 Nautical Miles probably 
represents the most important accomplishment in the area of maritime 
delimitation between both countries for a number of reasons: 
i.  The Treaty Broke the Long and Difficult Diplomatic Impasse That 
Adversely Affected the Friendly Relations Between                                       
Both Countries 
For almost twenty years, Mexico anxiously awaited for the U.S. Senate to 
approve a bilateral agreement that established “provisional” maritime 
boundaries between the respective 200 nautical mile zones in the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Pacific Ocean in 1976. 
The lack of a bilateral agreement dividing a submarine area in the central 
and deepest part of the Gulf of Mexico possibly containing a transfrontier 
hydrocarbon reservoir made Mexico fear that U.S. oil companies, in the 
absence of a clear and precise maritime boundary, may start drilling for 
mineral riches from the American side, unilaterally draining out the mineral 
resources located in Mexico’s side. In that country, this fear (popularly 
known as the “Efecto popote”) became a grave concern on a national 
scale fueled by intense patriotic sentiments. 
The breaking up of the impasse and the signing of the 2000 Treaty 
were interpreted by both countries as a clear sign of good faith on their 
part, clearly indicating that they were ready to turn their attention to the 
most important matter in front of them: the definition of the limits of the 
continental shelf in the submarine area of the western Gulf of Mexico 
 
in the Western Gulf of Mexico Beyond 200 Nautical Miles, Background Sheet, U.S.-
Mex., June 9, 2000, 2143 U.N.T.S. 417. 
 117. See PALACIOS TREVIÑO, supra note 101, at 103. However, in the Foreword of 
this book, author Agustin Gutiérrez Canet provides slightly different figures: “The 
Western Gap comprises an area of approximately 17,000 sq. km. Out of this area, 10,556 
sq. km. correspond to Mexico, equivalent to 60.36% of the total area, and to the United 
States 6,932, equivalent to 39.64%.” Id. at vi.   
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beyond the limits of their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs), 
along the approximately 129 nautical miles of the area known as the 
“Western Gap.” At that time, the delimitation of this gap had become of 
the highest priority to the U.S. interests as petroleum exploration had 
moved into deeper waters. 
ii.  The Ten Year “Moratorium” Did Away With Mexico’s Fears That 
the United States Was Going to Unilaterally Exploit the                   
Transfrontier Hydrocarbon Deposit 
For almost two decades, Mexico’s attention (as reflected in the national 
press reports) was centered on the perceived threat that American oil 
companies were getting ready to use their advanced technologies (especially 
the so-called “horizontal drilling”) to start tapping into the mineral 
resources in the Western Gap. The 2000 Treaty by the United States and 
Mexico that put in place a “ten year moratorium on petroleum drilling or 
exploitation,” included in Article IV (1), was lauded in that country as a 
triumph of Mexico’s diplomacy. 
iii.  For the First Time in the Diplomatic History of Both Countries,             
the 2000 Treaty Addressed the Delicate Question of A                 
“Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoir” in the Gulf                                     
of Mexico, Beyond the Respective 200 Nautical                                            
Mile Maritime Zones 
“Transboundary reservoirs”(whether containing hydrocarbons, natural 
gas or water, for example) constitute today a most delicate and highly 
technical question under international law. Thus, the definition of these 
reservoirs, their boundaries and especially the manner in which the 
resources contained in these reservoirs are to be allocated between the 
involved States are pending matters that today continue to require careful 
analysis and consideration from the viewpoint of international law, both 
conventional and customary. 
For many years, the existence of “binational underground acquifers” 
bisected by the international boundary between the United States and 
Mexico has been a difficult and controversial question that the International 
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) has not been able to resolve 
to the satisfaction of its member countries.118 
 
 118. See, e.g., Stephen P. Mumme, Advancing Binational Cooperation in 
Transboundary Aquifer Management in the U.S.-Mexico Border, 16 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 77 (2005); M. Diane Barber, The Legal Dilemma of Groundwater 
Under the Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexico-U.S. Border Area, 24 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 639 (2004); Robert E. Hall, Transboundary Groundwater Management, 21 
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A similar issue, recently pointed out by the Mexican press,119 has been 
the contrasting difference (quantity wise) between the utilization of 
natural gas extracted from a transboundary reservoir that has been exploited 
by Mexico and the United States. Whereas in the State of Tamaulipas, on 
the Mexican side, there are only nine wells that extract gas from the 
reservoir, on the American side across the boundary, the contiguous State of 
Texas currently operates 174 wells that tap gas from the same 
“transboundary natural gas reservoir” bisected by the boundary line 
between both countries. However, until today, it seems that Mexico has 
not taken any diplomatic steps to bring to the attention of the United 
States this apparent disproportionate utilization of the natural gas coming 
from this “transboundary reservoir,” that seems to run contrary to the 
international law principle that advocates “the efficient and equitable 
exploitation” of the resources contained in any kind of these reservoirs. 
Principles embraced by both countries and recently reiterated in the 
recent instruments of 2000 and 2012. 
Given the growing importance that water and natural gas have for the 
economic development of the border areas along the U.S.-Mexico 
boundary, it may not be unexpected if in the future Mexico may decide 
to bring to the attention of the United States the question of the “fair and 
equitable utilization” of (i) transboundary acquifers or (ii) transboundary 
natural gas reservoirs bisected by the international boundary. 
iv.  The Treaty Established A Timely and Efficient Mechanism for the 
Parties to Consult and Exchange Information on Technical                               
and Administrative Questions 
Articles IV, V and VI of the Treaty detail these areas, such as facilitation 
of requests from the other party to authorize geological and geophysical 
studies; the exchange of information resulting from scientific studies “to 
 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 873 (2004); Robert C. Gavrell, The Elephant Under the 
Border: An Argument for a New, Comprehensive Treaty on the Transboundary Waters 
and Aquifers of the U.S. and Mexico, 16 COLO. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 189 (2005). 
 119. See Alejandra Buendía & Palmira González, Saca EU ventaja en gas a México 
[The U.S. Takes Advantage of Gas from Mexico], REFORMA, Apr. 9, 2012, at 1 (pointing 
out that the total gas production from the Mexican States of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and 
Tamaulipas totals 2,879 wells, producing 1,345 million cubic feet of gas daily; on the 
U.S. side, across the border, Texas has 95,014 wells that produce 21,700 million cubic 
feet of gas daily). See also Christopher D. Henry & Robert A. Morton, Trans-Boundary 
Geothermal Resources of Texas and Mexico, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 973 (1982). 
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determine the possible existence and location of transboundary reservoirs;” 
written summaries of national laws and regulations pertaining to offshore 
and gas development, etc. 
The conduct of marine scientific research by vessels is the most common 
way of acquiring scientific and other technical information to determine 
the location, presence, quantity and quality of geological structures and 
other formations that may contain mineral resources in the Gulf of Mexico. 
In 2002 and 2003, the vessel “Veritas Vantage” was chartered by Mexico’s 
SENER and the Mexican Navy to conduct a 3D survey of the Alaminos 
Canyon in the Gulf of Mexico; also, in 2002, the ship “Gyre” of Texas 
A&M University conducted marine scientific research to study the Sigsbee 
Deep in the same gulf.120 
Anticipating the probable existence of a transfrontier hydrocarbon 
reservoir that was to be scientifically confirmed as a result of all of these 
technical studies, Mexico took advantage of this opportunity to amend 
and update key federal statutes having to do with PEMEX, and with the 
exploitation of oil and natural gas as a natural resource under the direct 
control of the Nation pursuant to Article 27 of Mexico’s Political 
Constitution of 1917 (as amended).121 These amendments (made at the 
initiative of President Calderón) were especially made to allow U.S. 
investors to enter into contracts with PEMEX in order to explore and 
exploit the mineral riches in the deep and central part of the Gulf of 
Mexico, without conflicting with Mexico’s Political Constitution.122 
  
 
 120. See VARGAS, MEXICO AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 36, at 387–88, 
390; see also id. at 281–404. 
 121. In general, Article 27 of the Political Constitution prescribes that: “. . . the 
Nation is vested with the direct ownership of all natural resources of the continental shelf 
and the submarine shelf of the islands; of all minerals or substances, which . . . form 
deposits of a nature distinct of the components of the earth itself; . . . petroleum and all 
solid, liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons . . . . [In these cases] the ownership of the Nation 
is inalienable and imprescriptible and the exploitation, use and utilization of the resources in 
question, by private individuals or by companies incorporated under Mexican law, may 
not be undertaken except through permits [concesiones] granted by the Federal 
Executive, pursuant to the rules and conditions established by the law.” Id. at 6–14, 40–
42 (emphasis added). 
 122. For a detailed discussion and analysis of these amendments -generally known 
as the “Reforma Petrolera,” see generally UNIVERSIDAD PANAMERICANA, LA REFORMA 
PETROLERA [THE OIL REFORM] (Francisco de Rosenzweig Mendialdua & José Lozano 
Díez eds., 2008), and INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO, REGULACIÓN 
ENERGÉTICA CONTEMPORÁNEA: TEMAS SELECTOS [CONTEMPORARY ENERGY REGULATION: 
SELECTED TOPICS] (2009). 
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v.  In Sum, the 2000 Treaty May Be Characterized As A “Preparatory 
Treaty” That Established the Required Legal, Technical and 
Administrative Infrastructure for the United States and                            
Mexico to Move Up to the Next Level: The Negotiation                                   
and Signing of the 2012 Agreement 
Accordingly, the 1970, 1978 and 2000 Treaties should be perceived not 
as individual treaties but as  three components in a legal process gradually 
converging into the signing of the 2012 Agreement. However, the process 
of defining maritime boundaries in key submarine areas between the 
United States and Mexico will not be completed until these countries enter 
into a maritime boundary agreement for the Eastern Gap of the Gulf of 
Mexico and a similar agreement in the Pacific Ocean. 
The final step in the process of establishing maritime boundaries in 
submarine areas of the continental shelf in 200 nautical mile zones will 
be when the United States and Mexico individually sign a similar 
delimitation agreement with Cuba. 
III.  THE 2012 UNITED STATES-MEXICO AGREEMENT ON 
TRANSBOUNDARY HYDROCARBON RESERVOIRS                                                      
IN THE GULF OF MEXICO 
As time goes by, the 2012 Agreement will be recognized as among the 
most important treaties in the diplomatic and economic histories of the 
United States and Mexico. For a number of reasons explained later in 
this section, the 2012 Agreement deserves to be placed in a special, almost 
unique, category.  Rather than the usual type of “treaty,” it is to be noted 
that both parties decided to call it an “Agreement.”123 
Once the submarine maritime boundary was established in the Gulf of 
Mexico (western and eastern portions) and in the Pacific by the 1978 
Treaty; and that both parties agreed in the 2000 Treaty on the exploration 
and exploitation of possible oil and gas reservoirs extending across the 
 
 123. Both doctrine and international jurisprudence have expressly asserted that the 
name or “terminology” used to refer to a treaty “is not a determinant factor as to the 
character of an international agreement or undertaking. In the practice of States . . . and 
in the jurisprudence of international courts, there exists a great variety of usage; there 
are many different types of acts to which the character of treaty stipulations has been 
attached.” South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 331 
(Dec. 21) (emphasis added); see also Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1994 I.C.J. 112, 120 (July 1). 
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continental shelf boundary, then the United States and Mexico were 
finally ready to sign the 2012 Agreement—a long and bumpy diplomatic 
and legal road that took the parties over three decades to transit. This 
bilateral instrument was specifically formulated “to establish a legal 
framework to achieve safe, efficient, equitable and environmentally 
responsible exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs in the 
Gulf of Mexico.”124 
Rather than signing a traditional formal treaty like those concluded in 
1978 and 2000, this time the United States and Mexico entered into an 
“Agreement” creating an international contractual relationship for the 
exploration and exploitation of one of the largest submarine reservoirs 
located in the central and deepest part of the Gulf of Mexico—in other 
words, a contractual business relationship.125 
The allocation of submarine mineral resources contained in transborder 
hydrocarbon reservoirs that belong to different countries has been for the 
last five or six decades a relatively novel, intriguing and a most challenging 
question under international law. Given the considerable strategic value 
of these vast submarine resources (consisting of liquid and gas 
hydrocarbons), their major economic importance and the incredible 
technological advancements accomplished by major oil companies to be 
able to tap these resources under most challenging physical and geological 
conditions, countries with these transborder resources have been compelled 
to find equitable, practical and peaceful arrangements to proceed with 
the commercial exploitation of these submarine resources. Accordingly, 
these arrangements have produced an increasingly growing number of 
international legal arrangements (reflected in decisions by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) as well as in bilateral treaties)126 that have influenced 
the formulation of subsequent international arrangements. 
The 2012 Agreement simply could not escape being influenced by the 
legal content of these seminal international judicial decisions by the ICJ 
 
 124. Agreement Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of 
Mexico, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 20, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/2012/ 
185259.htm. 
 125. From a terminological viewpoint, the Agreement Concerning Transboundary 
Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico, supra note 124, may be categorized as a 
“Treaty-Contract”, with some of its provisions governed by international law (i.e. art. 3, 
art. 19, and art. 25). 
 126. Some of these decisions and arrangements include, inter alia, the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20); “Timor 
Gap Theory” Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in the Area Between the Indonesian 
Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, Austl.-Indon., Dec. 11, 1989, 1654 
U.N.T.S. 105; The Agreement Relating to the Joint Exploitation of the Natural 
Resources of the Sea-bed and Sub-soil of the Red Sea in the Common Zone, Sudan-
Saudi Arabia, May 16, 1974, 952 U.N.T.S. 193. 
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and other agreements. Thus, the U.S.-Mexico agreement emulated in 
substance and format parts of these agreements, especially those delineating 
the legal and cooperative framework for the joint development of 
transborder hydrocarbon resources between coastal States.127 
The business relationship built into the 2012 Agreement is both 
unprecedented and unique. It is unprecedented because there has been no 
other bilateral instrument between these countries that resembles neither 
in legal substance nor in format the 2012 Agreement. Accordingly, the 
purpose of this section is to discuss, analyze and comment on the most 
important Articles (i.e., “clauses” or legal sections) of this agreement. And 
it is unique because of the clear commercial content of this international 
contract. Customarily, the United States reserves entering into this type 
of “business agreements” only with countries placed at a similar level 
with the United States such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, 
and Canada. 
This section is divided into these parts: Part I, simply lays down the 
advantages and disadvantages of this Agreement for each of the parties; 
Part II, provides a discussion of the operative part of the Agreement; 
Part III offers a commentary of the different international law principles 
—whether conventional or derived from customary international law— 
that are incorporated into this Agreement; and, finally, Part IV discusses 
on the implications this Agreement may produce upon other legal, 
economic and diplomatic areas between the United States and Mexico. 
A.  Part I: Advantages and Disadvantages of the 2012 Agreement 
Evidently, the 2012 Agreement was signed because both the United 
States and Mexico considered it mutually beneficial. From an optimistic 
perspective, this legal instrument allows to convey the relative impression 
that today’s relations between both countries are close and friendly. 
 
 127. THE PEACEFUL MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES 13–17 (Blake, 
Hildesley, Pratt, Ridley & Schofield eds., 1995); Masahiro Miyoshi, The Basic Concept 
of Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources on the Continental Shelf, 3 INT’L J. 
ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 1, 5 (1988); David M. Ong, Joint Development of Common 
Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: ‘Mere’ State Practice or Customary International Law?, 
93 AM. J. INT’L L. 771, 776 (1999).  In his book, Palacios Treviño specifically refers to 
the Convention on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves of the two States in the 
Bay of Biscay (Golfe de Bascogne/Golfo de Vizcaya) in 1974.  See PALACIOS TREVIÑO, 
supra note 101, at 65, 83, 97. 
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The long and uncomfortable era of distant and prickly diplomatic 
interactions between both countries (emanating from the 1848 war, the 
Chamizal case, the expropriation of the oil industry and the unilateral 
closing of the “Bracero” program) has been erased and abandoned. Today, 
the United States and Mexico seem to have become true allies sharing 
not only a binational boundary but a common destiny for the present and 
the future; a stronger relationship that is naturally imposed by geographical 
contiguity, by firmer and more fluid economic ties and by a growing 
relationship between their respective peoples, accentuated by the increasing 
demographic presence of Mexican-Americans and Mexican people in the 
United States and, at the same time, the larger presence of U.S. nationals in 
Mexico. 
From a strategic and economic angle, the 2012 Agreement neatly fits 
within the latest policy predicating that the United States is to sever its 
decades-long dependency of importing oil from Arab countries128 and 
rely more and more from closer and safer sources, such as Canada and 
Mexico and, eventually, the Arctic. The tensions caused by the Arab spring 
upheavals in Lybia, Egypt, Tunisia and currently Syria, in addition to the 
headaches produced by a possible nuclear Iran and a likely Israeli attack 
to destroy Iran’s nuclear installations, resulting in the closing of the 
Strait of Hormuz, have clearly exposed the vulnerability of the United States 
in these tense and unpredictable scenarios. In light of these eventualities, 
having a close, safe and unobstructed access to rich transboundary 
hydrocarbon reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Pacific is, 
without a doubt, the best alternative. 
From a pessimistic viewpoint, the 2012 Agreement may be nothing 
more than a “Pandora’s box.” Given the technical and legal complexities 
contained in the agreement, the colossal economic and political interests 
at stake, and especially the contrasting differences between PEMEX, until 
now a governmental structure with poor international experience, and 
the savvy major U.S. oil companies, added to the intricacies embedded 
in two different legal systems, these components combine to produce a 
distasteful and unusual cocktail similar to mixing oil and water. 
1.  For the United States 
From the U.S. perspective, this agreement had been long awaited by 
U.S. oil companies for decades that needed it to provide them with 
requisite clear and open legal access to the oil rich areas located in the 
 
 128. See Clifford Krauss, U.S. Reliance On Saudi Oil Goes Back Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 17, 2012, at 1. 
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Western Gap, beyond 200 nautical miles, along the central 135 nautical 
mile boundary line in the Gulf of Mexico. 
It is clear that the government of the United States (through the 
coordinated work of the Department of State and the Department of the 
Interior) simply functioned as the official legal conduit to negotiate and 
sign the 2012 Agreement to open up the legal way for American oil 
companies to exploit one of the richest and untapped reservoirs in the 
Gulf of Mexico.129 The agreement  clearly responded to the interests of 
the U.S. oil industry and was in conformance with both U.S. law and 
international law, including the pertinent provisions of the 1958 U.N. 
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and the 1982 U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, including those principles forming a part of 
customary international law.130 It can be reasonably assumed that the 
language of the Draft Agreement initially submitted by the U.S. Department 
of State to Mexico had already been cleared by the American Petroleum 
Institute on behalf of the U.S. oil industry. 
In this regard, the 2012 Agreement may share some similarities with 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in the sense that 
this was also an “agreement” (and not a Treaty) that established the rules 
for the opening and expansion of trade with Mexico (and Canada) for the 
benefit of American companies principally in the industrial, pharmaceutical 
and agricultural sectors. 
Some of the disadvantages may include the contrasting difference 
between the large, complex and technically advanced oil industry of the 
United States, considered to be among the most modern and technologically 
advanced on a global scale, and the relatively modest profile of PEMEX 
at the international level. Jesús Reyes Heroles, Director General of PEMEX, 
in his presentation before the Mexican Senate at the forum titled 
“Legislative Reform to Strengthen PEMEX,” said: 
 
 129. In his prepared statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Dr. Hedberg said that this “northwestern part of the central Gulf [of Mexico]— 
some 25,000 square miles—could be by far the most promising deep-water petroleum 
territory . . .” See Hedberg’s Statement, supra note 79. It should also be remembered that 
there is a second transborder hydrocarbon reservoir in the “Eastern Gap” in the Gulf of 
Mexico and a third one in the Pacific, all of which will be subject to the negotiation and 
signing of similar bilateral “Agreements” with Mexico in the near future. 
 130. When the United States established its 200 n.m. exclusive economic zone, it 
recognized that most of the principles and rules contained in the 1982 U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea already formed a part of customary international law. See 
Proclamation 5030: Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of America, 48 Fed. 
Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14, 1983). 
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PEMEX has been condemned to be a corporation without a strategy for growing, 
without international presence, with no policy for technological modernization, 
without a strategy for human resources, without international positioning, a hostage 
of normativity and bureaucracy and, what is worst, [a corporation] without a 
vision for the future.131 
There is no question that PEMEX is likely to take a relatively long 
period of time to learn and adjust to properly interact, communicate and 
especially negotiate on specific administrative, technical, financial or 
legal questions with U.S. federal entities and with corporate executives 
from U.S. oil industries within the context of the 2012 Agreement. This 
difficult and relatively delicate process may range, inter alia, from simple 
language problems, timely compliance with deadlines, technical  and 
scientific terminology, format and style of technical reports, interpretation 
of highly technical and scientific data, handling of advanced and highly 
expensive computers and the use of sophisticated software to less technical 
questions such as social and cultural differences.132 
2.  For Mexico 
From the Mexican perspective, the 2012 Agreement may be advantageous 
for a number of reasons. First, because it eliminated that country’s perceived 
threat that American oil companies may start exploiting unilaterally the 
transboundary reservoir from the U.S. side, tapping the oil located in the 
Mexican side of the reservoir. The Agreement established a legal 
framework stipulating the manner in which both parties, after proper 
consultations and exchanges of information, would conduct any exploration 
and exploitation activities near the delimitation line (Article 4.1). At the 
same time, the Agreement obligates each party to provide written notice 
to the other when either party “is aware of the likely existence  of a 
Transboundary reservoir” (Article 4.2, subparagraph a). And Article 6 
provides that “any joint exploration and/or exploitation of a Transboundary 
reservoir or Unit Area pursuant to the terms of the Unitization agreement 
must be approved by the parties.” 
In more general terms, the 2012 Agreement will allow Mexico—through 
the Secretariat of Energy, PEMEX and Mexican Oil Institute (Instituto 
 
 131. See Agreement Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the 
Gulf of Mexico, supra note 124. See also Karla Urdaneta, Transboundary Petroleum 
Reservoirs: A Recommended Approach for the United States and Mexico in the 
Deepwaters of the Gulf of Mexico, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 333, 348, 351 (2010).  See 
generally Miriam Grunstein, Unitized We Stand, Divided We Fail: A Mexican Response 
to Karla Urdaneta’s Analysis of Transboundary Petroleum Reservoirs in the Deep 
Waters of the Gulf of Mexico, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 345, 345–67 (2011). 
 132. Some examples may include telephone and email protocols, lunch habits, and 
deadlines. 
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Mexicano del Petróleo) to step fully into the world arena where the 
American and international oil companies have decades of experience in 
what is known to be a very aggressive, slippery and confrontational 
business environment. This international exposure for PEMEX (and 
other Mexican federal agencies) is considered to be both practical and 
educational but also quite challenging. 
PEMEX will also benefit from having direct access to the U.S. regulatory 
system of the oil industry through the administrative activities of the 
Minerals Management Service (MMS), the Department of the Interior, 
and other federal and state agencies. 
At the international level, PEMEX has kept a relatively modest profile 
considering that this governmental company has lacked adequate financial 
resources,133 advanced equipment and technologies and human expertise. 
To say nothing of the technical and complex legislation the United States 
(or other countries like the U.K., Germany, Norway, France, Brazil, etc.) 
applies to regulate the activities of the oil industry, including its prolific 
and technical case law.134 Sooner than later, and especially in light of the 
2012 Agreement, PEMEX will have to devote steady and substantial 
financial resources to either create or strengthen certain technical areas 
for this fully-owned governmental company to operate at the highest 
level of efficiency on the challenging oil international business arena.135 
Another disadvantage Mexico is likely to overcome is the contrasting 
differences between the U.S. legal system and the Mexican legal system. 
Today, the U.S. legal system is among the most complex and technical 
on a global scale. The sole area of “oil law,” as a part of an even larger 
area of “energy law,” is composed of thousands of pages of highly technical 
statutory materials and detailed regulations, with no comparison with the 
relatively simple and concise federal laws and regulations recently amended 
by Mexico as a result of the so-called 2008 “Oil Reform” (Reforma 
 
 133. See Agreement Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the 
Gulf of Mexico, supra note 124. See also Martin Miranda, The Legal Obstacles to Foreign 
Direct Investment in Mexico’s Oil Sector, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 206, 242 (2009). 
 134. See generally Diagnóstico: Situación de PEMEX, SECRETARÍA DE ENERGÍA 
(SENER), available at http://www.pemex.com/files/content/situacionpemex.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2012). 
 135. See VARGAS, MEXICO AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 36; see supra note 
130 and accompanying text. 
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Petrolera), undertaken at the initiative of President Calderón on April 8, 
2008.136 
At the same time, it can be anticipated that in the same manner Mexico 
has been for decades regularly “adopting and adjusting” numerous U.S. 
statutes and regulations in a number of areas (such as environmental law, 
pollution controls, tax law, intellectual property, trade, family law, 
condominiums, etc.)137 Mexico is now likely to incorporate into Mexican 
statutory materials, mutatis mutandis, U.S. technical principles and 
regulations to be applied to the Mexican oil industry in the near future. 
Mexico simply cannot afford to devote the first one or two years after 
the 2012 agreement enters into force as a kind of “training or adjustment 
period” to become familiar with the practical intricacies associated with 
the factual implementation of the complex 2012 bilateral instrument. 
Accordingly, it is imperative for that country to be prepared financially, 
legally, technically and administratively, and be fully operational at the 
technical level, on the first day the Agreement enters into force. 
Assuming the 2012 Agreement is to enter into force after the U.S. 
Senate gives its advice and consent, and considering the legal and technical 
complexity of this bilateral instrument, it can be anticipated that some of 
its articles may lead to diverging interpretations. Therefore, both parties 
are to be cautious, flexible and open minded during the first years of 
implementation of this bilateral instrument to allow for its normal and 
unobstructed implementation. Only the passage of time will tell. The 
manner in which this Agreement is to be implemented will dictate not 
only its effective compliance and enforcement but, more importantly, its 
legal longevity. 
B.  Part II: Operative Part of the 2012 Agreement 
The extraordinary advancements of oil technology (combined with the 
conduct of resource-oriented marine scientific research and the construction 
of specialized space and marine platforms), added to the necessity of 
finding hydrocarbon reservoirs in an oil-thirsty global market, has prompted 
coastal States to turn to the oceans in their insatiable search for oil. 
 
 136. See generally JOSÉ DE JESUS MARTÍNEZ GIL, EL PETRÓLEO DE MÉXICO: BREVE 
HISTORIA, EVOLUCIÓN Y ESTADO ACTUAL [MEXICO’S OIL: BRIEF HISTORY, ITS EVOLUTION 
AND CURRENT SITUATION] (2012); INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO, 
supra note 120, at 411; UNIVERSIDAD PANAMERICANA, LA REFORMA PETROLERA: EL 
PASO NECESARIO [THE OIL REFORM: THE NECESSARY STEP] 3 (Francisco de Rosenzweing 
Mendialdua ed., 2008). For a discussion of Mexico’s federal statutes relative to its “Oil 
Reform,” see Section X in Part V of this article. 
 137. The long and pervasive U.S. influence upon Mexican law was referred to as 
the “Americanization of Mexican law.” See generally Stephen Zamora, The Americanization 
of Mexican Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 391 (1993). 
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Virtually, this trend by coastal States was initiated by the United States 
when President Truman issued his Presidential Proclamation on the 
Continental Shelf in 1945.138 
From a legal perspective, coastal States in all the ocean basins of the 
world turned first to their immediate and closer continental shelf areas 
where they started exploring and then commercially exploiting hydrocarbon 
resources in these submarine areas. As soon as these closer and shallow 
oil deposits became depleted, coastal States became compelled to move 
into submarine areas that were distant from the coast and found at deeper 
water depths. On a number of cases, these distant and deeper hydrocarbon 
reservoirs were bisected by the maritime boundary of two or more coastal 
States, thus posing challenging and delicate legal and technical questions 
under international law to determine how to allocate the mineral resources 
contained in these transboundary reservoirs among the involved States. 
Many of these cases found their way to the ICJseeking  a fair and legal 
solution; others were resolved by means of special agreements or treaties 
similar to the 2012 Agreement.139 In general, all of these seminal and 
interesting cases have produced a rich and varied jurisprudential and 
case law outcomes that, to a larger or minor extent, have influenced—and 
continue to do so—the crafting of the legal documents (whether agreements, 
treaties or contracts) addressing more recent cases. 
Regarding some of these seminal cases, some authors have said that 
the Timor Gap Treaty is the most comprehensive treaty of this kind  that 
provides a model for the creation of Joint administrative bodies, the 
division of the hydrocarbon reservoir into two areas and the strong 
emphasis on cooperative arrangements between the parties, including the 
obligation to share geological and scientific information, tax questions 
and dispute resolution provisions.140 
 
 138. See Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 2, 1945). 
 139. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 20); Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 
1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24); Agreement Concerning Settlement of Offshore Boundaries and 
Ownership of Islands between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, Qatar-U.A.E., Mar. 
20, 1969, 2402 U.N.T.S. 49; Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf Between the Two Countries, Nor.-U.K., Mar. 10, 1965, 551 U.N.T.S. 213; Treaty 
On the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor 
and Northern Australia, Austl.-Indon., Dec. 11, 1989, 1654 U.N.T.S. 105. For additional 
information, see supra notes 123 and 124. 
 140. Regarding these examples, see THE PEACEFUL MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY 
RESOURCES, supra note 127, at 3–19. 
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The 2012 Agreement has not escaped from studying these legal 
outcomes, emulating and adjusting some of those past arrangements, and 
even creating or establishing novel legal frameworks that may fit the 
special or unique legal and technical contours of those submarine areas 
in the central portion of the Gulf of Mexico. Because of this characteristic, 
the 2012 Agreement may be characterized as a “Composite Agreement,” 
in the sense that it incorporated in its language selected portions, specific 
arrangements, administrative structures, etc. of previous treaties or 
international arrangements. 
The 2012 Agreement is composed by twenty-five articles. This number is 
in symmetry with similar agreements entered into on this subject by other 
coastal states with transborder hydrocarbon reservoirs in different parts 
of the world. For purposes of discussion and brevity, a comment will be 
made in reference to each of the major seven Chapters forming the body 
of this international agreement, discussing only those articles considered 
to be important because of their substantive legal content. 
Chapter 1 is titled: “General Principles” and is formed by five articles. 
Article 1 defines the “Scope” of the Agreement as it applies to  the 
“cooperation between the Parties with regard to the joint exploration and 
exploitation of geological hydrocarbon structures and reservoirs that 
extend across the delimitation line, the entirety of which are located 
beyond nine nautical miles from the coastline.” 
The central purpose of the Agreement is for both Parties to undertake 
the Ajoint exploration and exploitation of two types of geological features: 
(i) geological hydrocarbon structures per se; and (ii) geological hydrocarbon 
reservoirs. The first type consists of large structures that may contain 
one or more reservoirs141 whereas the second type refers to a geological 
hydrocarbon reservoir. Both of these structures must comply with these 
two conditions: (a) they must straddle across the maritime delimitation 
boundary line (i.e., be transborder in nature) and (b) must be located, in 
their entirety, beyond nine nautical miles from the coastline. 
Pursuant to the international law of the sea (both dating back to the 
1958 U.N. Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 and the 
current 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea),142 it should be 
underlined that the coastal State does not outright own the submarine 
continental shelf but merely exercises over it “sovereign rights for the 
 
 141. For a scientific definition of these technical terms, see PETROLEUM EXTENSION 
SERV., UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, A DICTIONARY FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY (2005). 
 142. See United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf art.4, Apr. 29, 1958, 
499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312 (Both the United States and Mexico are parties to this 
Convention.); see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 78, Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 430 (Mexico is a party to this Convention, but the United 
States is not). 
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purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.” However, 
Ano one may undertake these activities “without the express consent of 
the coastal State.”143 
Article 1 of the Agreement should be read in conjunction with Article 
3, which provides that “Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as 
affecting the sovereign rights and the jurisdiction which each Party has 
under international law over the continental shelf which appertains to it.” 
Accordingly, the 2012 Agreement does not confer to the Parties any 
rights over living or mineral marine resources but, instead, simply 
establishes a legal cooperative framework between the United States 
and Mexico with regard to the joint exploration and exploitation of 
“geological hydrocarbon structures and reservoirs” in the central part of 
the Gulf of Mexico. In this regard, the same conventions prescribe that 
the rights over said natural resources “do not depend on occupation, 
effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.”144 
Article 2 of the Agreement contains a number of technical, scientific 
and legal “Definitions.” In particular, the following merit special attention:145 
a. “Delimitation Line” means the maritime boundary line 
established in the Gulf of Mexico by the corresponding 
1970 and 1978 Maritime Boundary Treaties and 2000 Treaty 
on the Continental Shelf, and any future maritime boundary 
lines mutually agreed by the United States and Mexico in 
the Gulf of Mexico; 
b. “Reservoir” is defined as “a single continuous deposit of 
hydrocarbons in a porous or permeable medium, trapped 
by a structural stratigraphic feature.” 
c. “Transboundary Reservoir means any reservoir which 
extends across the delimitation line and the entirety of which 
is located beyond nine nautical miles from the coastline, 
 
 143. See Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 142, at art. 2; see also 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 140, at art. 77, para. 2. These rights may 
be traced back to the 1945 Truman Presidential Proclamation over the Continental Shelf, 
the original antecedent of this submarine space. 
 144. Ley Federal Del Mar de México [Federal Oceans Act], supra note 41, at art. 
57–65 (following very closely the language of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, supra note 142, at art. 76–85). 
 145. Agreement Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of 
Mexico, supra note 124. 
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exploitable in whole or in part from both sides of the 
delimitation line.” 
d. “Transboundary Unit means a single geological hydrocarbon 
structure or reservoir which extends across the delimitation 
line the entirety of which is located beyond nine nautical 
miles from the coastline, exploitable in whole or in part 
from both sides of the delimitation line.” 
e. “Unit area means the geographical area described in a 
Transboundary Unit, as set out in the Unitization Agreement,” 
and 
f. “Unit Operating Agreement means an agreement made 
between the Licensees and the Unit Operator that, among 
other things, establishes the rights and obligations of the 
Licensees and the Unit Operator including, but not limited 
to, the allocation of costs and liabilities incurred in and 
benefits derived from operations in the Unit Area.” 
The definition of “Transboundary Reservoir” reproduced above in paragraph 
c) of Article 2 of the 2012 Agreement does not correspond with the 
explicit language of Article 1 of the Reglamentary Act of Article 27 of 
the Constitution in the Area of Oil (Ley Reglamentaria del Artículo 27 
Constitucional en el Ramo del Petróleo), although it is clearly in symmetry 
with its legal substance. Article 1 of the Reglamentary Act reads: 
For purposes of this Act, transborder reservoirs are considered those found 
within the national jurisdiction and having physical continuity outside said 
jurisdiction.  Transborder reservoirs may also be considered those reservoirs or 
mantles outside the national jurisdiction shared with other countries in accordance 
with the treaties to which Mexico is a party or pursuant to what is prescribed by 
the [1982] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
Since Mexico is a party to the 2012 Agreement, the definition provided 
by this Agreement clearly prevails.146 
Article 4 is one of the most detailed provisions in the Agreement. It 
refers to the modus operandi the Parties are to adhere to with respect to 
the “exploration and exploitation activities carried out within three statute 
miles of the Delimitation line.” 
Given the delicacy of these activities, the emphasis was placed on the 
obligation of the Parties to consult when these activities are first 
contemplated to be conducted. Evidently, disregarding the explicit 
protocol imposed by the Agreement is likely to only generate serious doubts 
 
 146. Id. (A similar interpretation would apply to the “Transboundary Unit” defined 
in the agreement.) 
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and misapprehensions between the contracting Parties, likely to lead to 
most serious problems stemming out of the lack of trust or good faith. 
This seems to be a particularly important article whose compliance 
Mexico is to follow very closely, given the uncomfortable situation 
experienced by this country when, in the absence of a binational agreement, 
the American oil companies remained silent when certain politicians and 
the American press in Mexico suggested that said companies were 
considering to proceed to the exploitation of the transborder hydrocarbon 
reservoir unilaterally siphoning out oil from Mexico’s side. 
The last article of this chapter, Article 5, establishes the manner in 
which the Parties, through their corresponding Executive Agencies 
determine whether a “Transboundary Reservoir” exists, as a result of a 
process of mutual consultations and once the Licensees, at the request of 
said Agencies, have already provided all the geological information 
relevant to such determination. 
Chapter 2 of the Agreement—composed of Articles 6 through 9— 
may be described as the core components of this unique instrument. This 
technical chapter addresses unitization questions (Article 6); the 
management of the transboundary reservoir prior to the formation of a 
transboundary unit (Article 7); the allocation of production (Article 8); 
and redetermination of the allocation of production (Article 9). Although 
paragraph 2 of Article 6 enlists twelve important components  of the 
Unitization Agreement, the complete text of this agreement remains  
confidential. In general, the language of Article 7 shows the special 
effort and detail put into this article by both Parties in order to agree on 
how to proceed with the exploitation of the reservoir based on the 
unitization agreements and associated Unit Operating Agreements and 
the conciliatory mechanisms put in place to move the Parties to approve 
said agreements. Similar conciliatory efforts are also found in relation 
with the delicate matter of the allocation and re-allocation of production, 
described in Articles 8 and 9. 
During the negotiation of the 2000 Treaty it was informally suggested 
by one of the members of Mexico’s team of negotiators, Lic. Palacios 
Treviño, that based on the principle of equidistance and the corresponding 
results reflected in the international maritime boundary that bisected the 
Western Gap in the Gulf of Mexico, out of the total submarine area of 
said Gap, “10,620 sq. km. correspond to Mexico (equivalent to 61.78% 
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of the total area) and 6,570 sq. km. to the United States (equivalent to 
38.22%).”147 
However, these percentages neither appear in the language of the 2000 
Treaty nor in the pertinent Articles of the 2012 Agreement. Which may 
lead to the interpretation that possibly the percentages to apply to the 
Unitization of the transborder hydrocarbon reservoir may be a delicate 
question still to be confidentially negotiated between the United States 
and Mexico at the right time, once the 2012 Agreement enters into force. 
Chapter 3 refers to the Unit Operating Agreement (UOA), and is 
composed of Articles 10 through 13. In case of conflict between the 
UOA and the Unitization Agreement, the provisions of the latter should 
prevail. According to Article 13, income generated from the exploitation 
of the Transboundary reservoirs shall be taxed in accordance with the 
applicable legislation of Mexico and the United States, respectively, 
including the 1992 Treaty for the Avoidance of Double Taxation between 
these countries. 
Chapter 4, consisting of Article 14, details the institutional arrangements 
in particular the Joint Commission to be in place to assist the Executive 
Agencies in administering the 2012 Agreement. Chapter 5 addresses the 
question of Settlement of Disputes, ranging from Consultations and 
Mediation (Article 15) to Expert Determination (Article 16) and Arbitration 
(Article 17). 
Chapter 6 refers to Inspections, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 
where the respective national law of each Party is going to play a 
preeminent place, subject to the procedures to be developed and agreed 
by both Parties. 
From the viewpoint of comparative law, given the dissimilarities 
between the technical and detailed U.S. regulations, on the one side, and 
the more general and concise Mexican counterparts, on the other, as well 
as the drastic differences between the monetary sanctions imposed under 
each domestic legal system, the activities under this chapter may lead to 
possible disagreements and eventual conflicts that may become quite 
serious when they may delay, suspend or outright stop oil production 
activities with costly economic consequences. For example, when a given 
environmental violation committed by a U.S. company may be sanctioned 
severely under U.S. law and the same violation may receive a nominal 
sanction under Mexican law, this clear discrepancy is likely to lead to 
protests from the U.S. side for the allegedly unfair and discriminatory 
treatment. Similar problems may arise regarding the preparation, experience 
 
 147. See supra text accompanying note 115. 
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and competency of the Mexican Inspectors vis-à-vis those of the United 
States. 
Given the importance of these activities and their sometimes dire 
consequences in the important areas of safety and environmental protection, 
the United States and Mexico should consider harmonizing or formulating 
uniform or binational standards especially designed for their applicability to 
the exploitation of the transborder hydrocarbon reservoirs in the Gulf of 
Mexico (and eventually in the Pacific). 
As a relatively closed ocean basin, the Gulf of Mexico has been 
severely affected by a number of oil spills and oil platform catastrophes 
ranging from the severe and persistent Ixtoc spill by PEMEX to the 
relatively recent but ecologically disastrous BP catastrophe.148 Accordingly, 
given the well-known risks and dangers associated with the exploitation 
of the transborder reservoir in the ultra-deep waters of the Gulf of 
Mexico, both the United States and Mexico should seriously consider 
entering into a bilateral agreement to protect this Gulf from a possible 
accident, spill or any other environmental catastrophe. Moreover, the 
creation of a special contingency fund, as part of such an agreement, should 
also be considered. 
In addition, a special protocol may also be necessary as an indispensable 
security measure against any possible terrorist attack intended to damage 
or destroy oil platforms, ducts or any infrastructure associated with the 
exploitation of the transborder hydrocarbon reservoir in the Gulf of 
Mexico. 
Chapter 7 of the Agreement contains the Final Clauses, and is composed 
of Articles 20 through 25, relative to confidentiality, amendments, entry 
into force, termination, ending of the moratorium established by the 
2000 Treaty, and the relationship with other agreements, respectively. 
C.  Part III: The 2012 Agreement and International Law 
The relationship between international law and transborder hydrocabon 
reservoirs within the context of American case law dates back to the 
1930’s and 1940’s when the Institute of Mining and Metallurgical 
Engineers and the Midcontinental Oil and Gas Association addressed the 
novel and challenging question of adopting a “Unitization” scheme for 
 
 148. See PETER LEHNER & BOB DEANS, IN DEEP WATER (2010). 
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the joint development of certain oil pools.149  Soon after, the signing of a 
number of international treaties by European and Asian countries and 
later on the decisions by international tribunals (including the well-known 
North Sea Continental Shelf  cases of 1969)150  placed this legal discussion 
more squarely within the ambit of international law. 
The passage of time, the advancement of oil technologies and especially 
the proliferation of treaties and international jurisprudence on this 
rapidly growing area of international law, are beginning to produce some 
principles, policy guidelines and recommendations in an attempt to 
introduce clarity, order and a useful legal and business methodology that 
may contribute to the progressive development and eventual codification 
on this specialized and technical subject. Time is to do its part. 
At the bilateral level, the United States and Mexico have systematically 
adhered to certain commonly shared international law principles, 
conducting themselves in conformance with their treaty obligations 
according to the old well-known maxim of pacta sunt servanda. Over the 
last couple of decades, the relations between these two countries appear 
to have gained in frequency and depth as reflected in the 
unprecedented and composite 2012 Agreement. 
It is important to recall that Mexico, in the conduct of its foreign 
affairs, officially embraces a selected number of international law principles 
of a fundamental nature that are endowed with special historical and 
legal significance to that country. These principles deserved to be recalled 
and they are enunciated by paragraph X of Article 89 of that country’s 
Political Constitution: 
Article 89. The faculties and obligations of the President are the following: 
. . . . 
X. To direct the conduct of foreign affairs and to enter into international 
treaties. . . . In the conduct of this policy, the head of the Executive Power 
shall observe the following normative principles: self-determination of 
peoples; no intervention; peaceful settlement of disputes; proscription of 
the threat or the use of force in international relations; legal equality of 
States; international cooperation for development; respect, protection and 
promotion of human rights and the defense of peace and international 
security.151 
In the area of transborder hydrocarbon reservoirs, and more specifically 
in relation with the 2012 Agreement, there are a number of principles, 
 
 149. See generally Miyoshi, supra note 127; see also Ely Northcutt, The Conservation 
of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1209–44 (1938). 
 150. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, ¶ 97 
(Feb. 20). 
 151. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.] art. 89 (Mex.). 
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normative guidelines and recommendations that seem to have been adhered 
to by the provisions of said Agreement. These salient legal norms belong 
to both conventional and customary international law. Some of them are 
well-recognized principles whereas in others their degree of recognition 
and acceptance ranges from solid principles to mere recommendations. 
1.  The Equidistance Principle and the Exploitability Principle 
In the course of signing several international maritime boundary treaties, 
in particular the 1970, 1978 and the 2000 Treaties, both the United States 
and Mexico, as parties to the 1958 U.N. Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf,152 have agreed to establish their maritime boundaries 
according to the Principles of Equidistance and  Exploitability predicated by 
Articles 6 and 1, respectively, of said convention. 
Article 1 of the 2000 Treaty describes the continental shelf boundary 
between these countries in the Western Gulf of Mexico beyond 200 
nautical miles as geodetic lines connected the listed sixteen turning and 
terminal points. In more explicit terms, in the Message of the President 
of the United States Transmitting the 2000 Treaty to the Senate he 
underlined that “this line represents and equidistant line drawn from the 
respective U.S. and Mexican coastal baseline, including the baselines of 
islands.”153 
As usual, in the United States the technical work relative to the drawing 
of the maritime boundary was left to be done by the Department of Marine 
Boundary and Resource Division, Office of The Geographer of the 
Department of State and, in Mexico, the General Directorate of Boundaries 
and International Rivers of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE) and 
 
 152. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Convention on the Continental Shelf, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.55 (Apr. 29, 1958) (adopted by the first United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea on April 29, 1958).  The United States signed it on 
Sept. 15, 1958; ratified it April 12, 1961; and this convention entered into force for all 
parties on June 10, 1964 in accordance with Article 11 (forty-three signatories, fifty-
eight parties). Mexico did not sign this convention but became a party by accession on 
August 2, 1966. “Accession” is the act whereby a state accepts the offer or the 
opportunity to become a party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states. It 
has the same legal effect as ratification. Accession usually occurs after a treaty has 
entered into force. 
 153. WILLIAM J. CLINTON & MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, TREATY WITH MEXICO ON 
DELIMITATION OF CONTINENTAL SHELF, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, S. DOC. NO. 106-39 (2d Sess. 2000). 
VARGAS (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2016  4:09 PM 
 
58 
by each of the respective sections of the competent International Boundary 
and Water Commission (IBWC). 
The “Exploitability Principle” applies for the determination of the 
outer boundary of the geological continental shelf. Therefore, based on this 
principle and pursuant to Article 1 of the 1958 U.N. Geneva Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, the outer boundary of this submarine territory may 
extend out “to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the 
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural 
resources of said areas,” including islands. 
Article 1 provides that the continental shelf of a coastal State extends 
beyond a depth of 200 meters “where the depth of the superjacent waters 
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources” of the shelf. The 
1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which Mexico is a party 
and which “the United States considers reflects customary international 
law” in this respect, provides a more scientifically based definition of the 
continental shelf. Article 76 provides that the continental shelf of a 
coastal State comprises the greater of either the area in which the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas extend beyond a country’s territorial 
sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or the area to a distance of 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. 
Under both definitions, the coastal state has exclusive control over the 
exploration and exploitation of the natural resources, including oil and 
gas, of the continental shelf.154 
In the Senate document regarding the 2000 Treaty, the Department of 
State wrote that “With respect to areas beyond 200 nautical miles from 
coastal baselines, the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea provide that certain criteria must be 
met to qualify as continental shelf. During the negotiations, both sides 
agreed that all the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas beyond 
200-mile EEZ limit in the Western Gulf of Mexico meet the legal 
requirements described in both Conventions.”155 
In an article on the maritime boundaries of the United States, Feldman 
and Colson, Deputy Legal Adviser and Assistant Legal Adviser designate 
of the State Department (who negotiated the 2000 Treaty with Mexico), 
explicitly recognized the applicability of these international law principles 
to the 1978 and the 2000 Treaties with Mexico.156  Interestingly, these 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Feldman & Colson, supra note 11, at 743–45, 750 (recognizing that these 
maritime delimitation agreements are based “on the equidistance method giving full 
effect to islands” and adding that “[t]he choice of method of methods of delimitation in 
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authors recognized the principle of sovereign equality of States recognized 
by Mexico also. 
From Mexico’s perspective, Lic. Palacios Treviño points out that at 
the beginning of the negotiations of said treaty, the U.S. delegation 
submitted to Mexico a draft treaty that drew the maritime boundary in 
the Western Gap strictly based on the equidistance method.157  The Mexican 
side did not accept this boundary because “this line was based exclusively 
on the equidistance method and it was necessary for Mexico to know 
both the hydrocarbon potential of the reservoir, as well as its distribution.” 
Palacios Treviño adds that Mexico argued that if the reservoir was 
located only in the U.S. side, then the delimitation proposed simply did 
not provide an equitable solution. Furthermore, if the hydrocarbon reservoir 
may have been divided by the maritime boundary, then this would be a 
case of a “transborder reservoir” and, also in this case, the treaty would 
have to then include “a regime for the exploration and exploitation of 
this reservoir.”158 
When Mexico announced the initiation of these negotiations with the 
United States in addition to underlining its support for the “method of 
equidistance,” it also pointed out that its respect for the following 
international law principles: (i) To preserve and guarantee the utilization of 
the natural resources in the zone [Western Gap] that correspond to the 
Mexican State; (ii) To guarantee the legal equality of the [negotiating] 
States; (iii) Its respect for international law; and (iv) Its observance of 
the norms of equity and reciprocity.159 
According to Palacios Treviño, Mexico suggested to the United States 
to also take into account Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 
1976: 
 
any given case, whether under the 1958 Convention or customary law, has therefore to 
be determined in the light of those [geographical and other relevant] circumstances and 
of the fundamental norm that the delimitation must be in accordance with equitable 
principles”) (quoting the Anglo-French 1977 Award).  See also Smith, supra note 63, at 
402 (asserting that “[e]quidistance was an appropriate method of delimitation in each of 
the boundary regions . . . including an exchange of notes in Mexico City on November 
24, 1976” (emphasis added). 
 157. See PALACIOS TREVIÑO, supra note 101, at 90–92. In this Communiqué the 
treaty negotiations in question were conducted with a “constructive spirit, recognizing 
them as a continuation of the Maritime Boundary Treaty of 1978 and taking into account 
international law.” Id. at 91. 
 158. Id. at 91–92. 
 159. Id. at 90. 
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Principle 21. States have, in accordance with the charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, their sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.160 
Principle 21 remains a cornerstone of international environmental law. 
According to Philippe Sands, this fundamental principle comprises two 
elements which cannot be separated without fundamentally changing their 
sense and effect: (1) the sovereign right of states to exploit their own 
natural resources; and (ii) the responsibility, or obligation, not to cause 
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction. That Principle 21 reflects customary law was 
confirmed by the ICJ’s 1996 Advisor Opinion of The Legality of the 
Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.161 
However, none of the principles suggested by Mexico found its way 
into the 2000 Treaty or into the 2012 Agreement.162 In contrast to Mexico’s 
interest in including a number of principles in the resulting agreements, 
the United States only made special reference to the equidistance principle 
and the exploitability clause. 
2.  There is No Rule of Capture at the International Level 
Prof. Masahiro Miyoshi, while explaining the basic concept of “Joint 
development,” asserts that this concept is opposed, by definition, to 
“individual or unilateral development,” characterized by application of 
the rule of (unrestricted) capture.163 
Historically—according to this author—this rule was considered to be 
“a legitimate principle in the development of land-based petroleum.”164 
However, when this rule came under close scrutiny by a group of 
international law experts and transborder oil specialists at the Third 
Workshop on the South-East Asian Seas at the East-West Center that 
 
 160. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, adopted by the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm, 
June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416. 
 161. Id.  
 162. See PALACIOS TREVIÑO, supra note 101, at 96. According to Palacios Treviño, 
Mexico made a proposal to the United States based on the U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 14, 1962, which was also declined. 
 163. Miyoshi, supra note 127, at 6 (with special Reference to the discussions at the 
East-West Center workshops on the South-Wast Asian seas). 
 164. The so-called “rule of capture” may be stated this way: “One who has the right 
to drill for and produce oil and gas from a particular tract of land may so produce such 
hydrocarbons even though the oil and gas produced is drained from beneath the land of 
another.” Joseph W. Morris, The North Sea Continental Shelf: Oil and Gas Problems, 2 
INT’L LAW. 191, 206 (1967). 
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discussed “The Basic Concept of Joint Development of Hydrocarbon 
Resources on the Continental Shelf,” this workshop reached the unanimous 
conclusion that “[n]o international rule of capture exists although as a 
practical matter nations will aggressively pursue resources and conflicts 
may arise.” 
Moreover, in relation with this legal issue, Prof. Jon Van Dyke added 
that nations with claims to hydrocarbon resources that overlap national 
boundaries have these duties under international law: (a) to consult with 
each other; (b) to share information about the nature of the resource;    
(c) to negotiate in good faith to reach and equitable agreement on the 
sharing of these resources; and (d) to refrain from taking resources clearly 
within the other nation’s jurisdiction.165 All of these duties are present in 
the language of the 2012 Agreement. 
In other words, whereas the “rule of capture” may be validly applied 
within the ambit of domestic law, neither customary international law 
nor conventional international law recognize the applicability of this 
domestic rule at the international level. Today, no country has the right 
to use the rule of capture to extract oil and gas from a particular tract of a 
submarine territory when the oil and gas in question is drained from 
beneath the submarine territory (whether a continental shelf or from the 
continental margin) that lawfully belongs to another coastal State. 
When this conclusion is applied to the situation of the Western Gap in 
the Gulf of Mexico between Mexico and the United States, it is evident 
that the United States, despite its advanced oil technology, simply did 
not have the right under international law to exploit the transborder 
hydrocarbon reservoir in the Western Gap, unilaterally draining Mexico’s 
oil and gas from Mexico’s side, because this would have been in clear 
violation of international law. 
It would seem that the ardent pleas made by Senator Conchello regarding 
the threat of the “Popote effect,” the numerous news articles in the 
Mexico City press and those authored by academicians, missed the 
important fact that there is no rule of capture at the international level.166 
  
 
 165. See Miyoshi, supra note 127, at 18. 
 166. See Pardinas, supra note 70, at 15–23, 50–72; see also Editorial, supra note 71. 
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3.  International Law Rules Advanced by the Experts 
Over the last decades, international law experts studying the legal 
ramifications derived from the joint development of transboundary 
hydrocarbon reservoirs have advanced a number of principles or rules 
applicable to these reservoirs, including these: 
a. The practice of negotiating and seeking agreement on the 
exploitation and apportionment of a common deposit is not 
mere usage but, rather, a current customary rule of international 
law;167 
b. State practice today has clearly established the obligation to 
negotiate in good faith about the exploitation and apportionment 
of international common petroleum deposits as a rule of 
customary international law;168 
c. Obligation from abstention from unilateral development;     
If one State should proceed to exploitation without the consent 
of the other interested States, it would deprive them of the 
profit which they might otherwise have made and therefore 
be inequitable. Thus all the States involved are obliged to 
refrain from unilateral exploitation. This obligation is 
understood to be embodied in Articles 74(3)  and 83(3) of the 
1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.169 
d. Obligation to negotiate in Good faith; 
Cooperation to avoid unilateral exploitation is a legal 
obligation. There is an obligation to negotiate in good faith 
towards positive cooperation for joint development;170 
e. Agreement by oil companies to transfer sufficient technical 
expertise to the participating governments to reduce the gap 
between and among the parties would ensure a better basis for 
cooperation;171 
f.   A factor of major importance in such joint arrangements is the 
acceptance and understanding on the part of the operating 
companies that the control and management require consideration 
 
 167. See Miyoshi, supra note 127, at 8 (this asserton was made by Dr. William T. 
Onorato.) 
 168. Id. at 9. Some writers disagree with this statement, opining that any actual 
subsequent cooperation in the exploitation and development of such deposits “is compelled 
only by practical considerations rather than by legal mandate. Nevertheless, relevant 
precedent and current State practice support te contention that the law requires such 
cooperation.” Id. 
 169. Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
 170. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
 171. Id. at 16. 
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of the politics, security, and culture of the participating 
countries;172 and 
g.  There are advantages and disadvantages in trying to harmonize 
laws of the two nations establishing the joint development 
zone. . . It may be more important to harmonize laws relating to 
the relationship between the nations and the operators than laws 
governing the personnel on the offshore rigs.173 
Compared with similar treaties, the 2012 Agreement is relatively brief. 
Its content lays down the basic rules that both Parties must comply with 
to make this joint venture functional, establishing a number of 
administrative bodies involved in its implementation and supervision 
and spelling out the mechanisms for the effective peaceful settlement of 
disputes. 
Domestically, this agreement will impose a number of very specific 
and technical tasks especially on PEMEX but also in other structures of 
Mexico’s public administration, including the Secretariat of Energy, the 
Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, the Secretariat of the Navy, the National 
Institute of Geography and Statistics and the National Commission on 
Hydrocarbons. 
More importantly, for this Agreement to function effectively, President 
Calderón took the initiative of adjusting the legal framework of Mexico’s 
hydrocarbon industry, a task that had not been attempted since 1938 when 
the oil industry was nationalized in that country. This major legislative 
overhaul already demanded not only the amendment a number of existing 
key statutes related to the oil industry but also the enactment of brand 
new federal statutes that will require salient changes in energy policies, 
entrepreneurial practices and the formulation of modern and efficient 
technical regulations. 
In anticipation of the 2012 Agreement, and its effective implementation, 
President Calderón on April 2008 submitted to the Mexican Senate 
legislative bill intending to restructure and restrengthen PEMEX, that 
country’s government’s sole public company. Eventually, with the support 
of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, and of all political parties, 
the initial bill was transformed into an ambitious package of amendments to 
modernize Mexico’s oil public sector. 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 18; see infra App. 3. 
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The surprising and unprecedented package included the following statues 
and regulations: 1) Reglamentary Act of Article of 27 of the Political 
Constitution (published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] of 
November 28, 2008; 2) PEMEX Act, DOF of November 28, 2008; 3) 
PEMEX Regulations, DOF of September 4, 2009; 4) Regulations to the 
Reglamentary Act of Article 27 of the Constitution, DOF of September 
22, 2009; 5) Act of the National Commission on Hydrocarbons, DOF of 
November 28,2008; 6) Act of the Reglamentary Commission of Energy, 
DOF of October 31 and November 28, 2008; and 7) Act for the Utilization 
of Renewable Energies and Financement of the Energy Transition, DOF 
of November 28, 2008 and January 1, 2012. 
This legislative overhaul required both substantial changes to key 
statutes governing the oil industry as well as the enactment of brand new 
pieces of legislation introducing changes in Mexico’s energy policies, 
PEMEX’s entrepreneurial practices and the formulation of modern  and 
efficient technical regulations throughout the oil public sector. Given the 
profound impact and serious transformation of the most important public 
company of Mexico’s Federal Public Administration, these changes become 
known in Mexico as the “Reforma Petrolera” (The Legislative  Oil 
Reform).174 
To set up the required administrative infrastructure and to make it 
work in a smooth and efficient manner, both internally and internationally, 
will demand a tremendous effort by Mexico—an effort that is nothing 
less than indispensable for the 2012 Agreement to be able to function 
properly, effectively and internationally. 
4.  Mexico’s Senate Approves the 2012 Agreement with                                  
the United States 
As soon as the 2012 Agreement was duly signed at Los Cabos, Baja 
California Sur, President Calderón gave instructions to the Secretary of 
the Interior (Segob) to submit said Agreement to the Senate seeking its 
prompt ratification, pursuant to Article 76, paragraph I of Mexico’s 
Political Constitution.175 At the request of the Chamber of Deputies and 
 
 174. See Francisco Rosenzweig Mendialdua, La Regulación del Sector Energético 
en México Antes y Después de la Reforma de Noviembre de 2008 [Regulation of the 
Energy Sector Before and After the Reform of November 2008], in REGULACIÓN 
ENERGÉTICA CONTEMPORÁNEA: TEMAS SELECTOS [CONTEMPORARY ENERGY REFORM: 
SELECTED TOPICS], supra note 122, at 387–424. 
 175. Serving as the Legislative Liaison Office, Segob submitted the Agreement to 
the Senate of the Republic on February 23, 2012, pursuant to Article 71, paragraph 1 
which enumerates the exclusive powers of the Senate, including the power to “approve 
the international treaties and diplomatic conventions signed by the Executive . . . .” 
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given the importance of this bilateral instrument, the Senate shared a 
copy of this Agreement with the lower Chamber of the Congress of the 
Union.176 
Within the Senate, this matter was submitted to the Commissions of 
Foreign Affairs, North America and Energy for its final consideration 
and technical opinion. On April 12, 2012, these three Commissions 
rendered their opinion,177 underlining the following considerations: 
1. First, that pursuant to Article 27 of the Constitution, in the 
commercial exploitation of hydrocarbons neither permits 
[Concesiones] nor contracts shall be granted; and second, that 
it corresponds to the Nation the exploitation of hydrocarbons 
pursuant to the terms established by the Reglamentary Act 
(Ley Reglamentaria del Art. 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del 
Petróleo), including its specific language regarding the 
legal definition of “transborder reservoirs” (yacimientos 
transfronterizos); 
2. The transborder reservoirs may be exploited “in the terms 
prescribed by the treaties to which Mexico is a party, 
entered into by the President of the Republic and approved 
by the Chamber of Senators.” 
3. The Legislative Power, while discussing the oil reform 
[Reforma energética] of 2008 specifically decided to include 
the exploitation of said transborder reservoirs. Within this 
context, the purpose of the legislature was to guarantee 
through the law the full exercise of national jurisdiction 
over the energy resources that form a part of the Mexican 
patrimony. Therefore, as it occurs in international practice, it 
 
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 71, ¶ I, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 8 de Septiembre 2012 (Mex.). 
 176. Cámara (de Diputados) Recibe Acuerdo Petrolero Transfronterizo México-
E.U. [House (of Representatives) Receives U.S.-Mexico Border Oil Agreement], EL 
UNIVERSAL, Mar. 15, 2012. 
 177. Dictamen de las Comisiones de Relaciones Exteriores, América del Norte y de 
Energía respecto del Acuerdo entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos 
de América relativo a los Yacimientos Transfronterizos de Hidrocarburos en el Golfo de 
México [Opinion of the Committees on Foreign Relations, North America, and Energy 
Regarding the Agreement Between Mexico and the United States of America Regarding 
Transboundary Reservoirs of Hydrocarbons in the Gulf of Mexico], GACETA DEL SENADO, 
Apr. 12, 2012. 
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is necessary to have an international instrument allowing 
the different States sharing hydrocarbon reservoirs an 
equitable exploitation under the rules guaranteeing sovereignty, 
providing legal certainty and allowing Mexico, in this case, 
to have access to the resources located in the submarine 
soil. 
4. For the above reasons, the three Commissions coincide in 
their opinions that the 2012 Agreement between Mexico 
and the United States constitutes a step of major importance 
that the country may have access to the hydrocarbons that 
eventually may share with its northern neighbor.  Furthermore, 
is the Commissions consider that this Agreement does not 
contradict any constitutional or legal provision, given the fact 
that the national sovereignty may be exercised, without 
restrictions, since the signatory countries cannot interpret 
such Agreement unilaterally for the benefit of their own 
interests. Having established clear rules regarding the 
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons found in possible 
transborder reservoirs, these activities may be undertaken in 
an efficient, safe, and equitable manner, with due respect to 
the environment.  
5. In order to formulate their technical opinion (dictamen), 
these Commissions have taken into consideration the 
comments and observations made by the SRE in the 
document: “Description of the Agreement” (Descripción del 
Acuerdo) that was enclosed with the international instrument 
when it was sent to the Senate, in these terms: 
“The Agreement between Mexico and the United States 
of America relative to Transborder Reservoirs in the Gulf 
of Mexico establishes the bases for cooperation between 
both States regarding the joint exploration and exploitation 
of the geological structures of hydrocarbons and reservoirs 
that straddle the maritime boundary, whose totality is 
situated beyond nine nautical miles from the coastline. It 
should be clarified that the mentioned limit of nine nautical 
miles is due to the fact that the federal government of the 
United States does not have jurisdiction over the resources 
in the marine subsoil found within said distance because 
in that country the sovereignty over said resources belongs 
to the States of the Union, and in this specific case to the 
State of Texas, with which the signing of a treaty is not 
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possible, some forms of cooperation similar to those 
contained in the Agreement will be explored.” 
“The Agreement provides full certainty to both countries 
through the establishment of a clear legal framework that 
will allow a safe, efficient, equitable and environmentally 
responsible exploitation of the transborder hydrocarbon 
reservoirs that may be found along the maritime 
boundaries established between Mexico and the United 
States in the Gulf of Mexico.” 
6. The SRE added: 
Regarding Mexico’s sovereignty, “the Agreement’s 
language provides that its text shall not be interpreted in 
a manner that may affect the sovereign rights and the 
jurisdiction that both Mexico and the United States exercise 
over their respective continental shelf, in accordance with 
international law.” 
“Adhering to the international practice in those cases 
when there are transborder hydrocarbon reservoirs between 
two or more States, the governments of Mexico and the 
United States decided to adopt the method of “unification 
of reservoirs” (unificación de yacimientos) as the proper 
mechanism for the exploration and exploitation of 
the transborder reservoirs existing between both 
countries, because this mechanism offers the best 
utilization and efficiency of the transborder reservoir.”178 
Based on the favorable technical opinion rendered by the 
three Senate Commissions, with a vote of 69 votes in 
favor, 21 against and 1 abstention, the Senate of the 
Republic ratified the 2012 Agreement on April 12, 2012.179 
 67 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Boletin-0912: Ratifica el Senado el Acuerdo de Yacimientos Transfronterizos, 
SENADO DE LA REPÚBLICA ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS (Apr. 12, 2012), http:// 
comunicacion.senado.gob.mx/index.php/periodo-ordinario/boletines/3440-boletin-0912-
ratifica-senado-acuerdo-de-yacimientos-transfonterizos.  On May 22, 2012, the Diario 
Oficial de la Federación (DOF) published a decree approving the 2012 Agreement 
between Mexico and the United States. See also Jorge Monroy, Aprueban el Pacto sobre 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
1. The 2012 U.S.-Mexico Agreement on Transboundary Reservoirs 
in the Gulf of Mexico is a unique and unprecedented bilateral 
agreement in the history of both countries. It is unique 
because it establishes a cooperative legal framework to proceed 
with the joint commercial exploitation and further exploration 
of the transboundary hydrocarbon reservoir located in the 
Western Gap in the Gulf of Mexico. And it is unprecedented 
because this agreement practically operates as a business 
partnership for these countries to embark upon in what may 
be described as the very first commercial venture between them. 
A venture of enormous significance for the strategic and 
economic consequences it provides for the present and future 
of both countries. 
2. Evidently, this agreement is mutually beneficial for Mexico 
and the United States. Mexico will benefit enormously to become 
directly engaged with the country whose oil industry occupies 
a salient and singular place on a global scale for its advanced 
scientific, technological and industrial developments in this 
important economic sector. For the United States, the 
commercial exploitation of this transboundary reservoir—placed 
on its own backyard—will no doubt guarantee the United 
States a safe and unimpeded access to a domestic and rich oil 
reservoir. Having this safe and easy access to a highly needed 
source of oil will substantially reduce the growing dependency 
from Arab oil the United States has been experiencing over 
the past decades and the threat that this Arab supply may 
simply disappear should the transit through and over the Strait 
of Hormuz be violently interrupted by a military conflict.  
3. This Agreement also contributes to enhance and better define 
the policy that predicates that, in the near future,  the United 
States, Canada and Mexico should structure a plan that would 
rely in guaranteeing close and safe hydrocarbon reservoirs 
located in the western hemisphere, i.e., the United States, 
Canada and Mexico, including future Arctic sources. 
4. In anticipation of this bilateral Agreement, Mexico undertook 
the delicate task of overhauling the legal, administrative and 
 
los Yacimientos Transfronterizos, EL ECONOMISTA, Apr. 12, 2012; Senado Ratifica 
Acuerdo Mexico-EU sobre Hidrocarburos, EL UNIVERSAL, Apr. 12, 2012. 
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technical infrastructure of its oil industry, centered around that 
monolithic and monopolistic governmental structure known as 
PEMEX. For over seventy years, this official corporate entity 
became not only an essential but literally an indispensable 
component for Mexico’s economic and social development, 
including the financing of its own public sector. On April 8, 
2008, President Calderón submitted to the Mexican Senate a 
major legislative bill to modernize and restructure PEMEX, 
jointly with several other bills amending federal statutes closely 
related to the oil industry, for consideration to the Mexico’s 
Congress. Indeed, a monumental and well-coordinated effort. 
However, the manner in which these substantial changes are 
to be effectively implemented will determine, to a large and 
delicate extent, the practical and efficient implementation of 
the 2012 Agreement. It may not be exaggerated to say that the 
smooth and effective implementation of the bilateral agreement 
will depend upon on the legal content of the corresponding 
regulations and especially their appropriate enforcement. A 
vital and delicate task left exclusively in the hands of Mexico. 
  The contrasting differences between the legal systems of the 
United States and Mexico are not likely to contribute to 
ameliorate the legal differences between these countries. 
Therefore, a special effort is to be made to be prepared with 
mechanisms that will assist in reconciling such differences and, 
more importantly, solve problems in a quick and practical 
manner. 
5. Today, there are two existing transborder hydrocarbon reservoirs 
that are still pending to be divided by a maritime boundary 
line between the United States and Mexico: first, the Eastern 
Gap in the Gulf of Mexico and, second, a similar one in the 
Pacific Ocean. In light of the 2012 Agreement, it is expected 
that these two pending reservoirs may follow the same 
cooperative and joint development arrangement reflected in 
the language of the current agreement. Furthermore, it is only 
logical to expect that the positive example of the joint 
partnership established by the 2012 Agreement may be 
applied to other commercial, economic and industrial areas 
between these two countries in the years to come. 
VARGAS (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2016  4:09 PM 
 
70 
6. Eventually, the United States and Cuba may have to negotiate 
a possible transboundary agreement if scientific studies 
determine the existence of such a reservoir between these 
countries in the Gulf of Mexico. From Mexico’s perspective, 
it is likely that in the future Mexico may have to negotiate 
separate maritime boundary agreements with Cuba, Belize, 
Guatemala and Honduras. 
7. In sum, the 2012 Agreement may be Mexico’s best opportunity 
to modernize and strengthen its oil industry, solidify its 
economy and become a business partner with the United States. 
This bilateral instrument opens up a path to forge a brighter 
and more prosperous future for the people of Mexico in their 
transit towards a true democratic nation where peace and justice 
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Steven Groves, U.S. Accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 










































Source: Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the United Mexican States on the Delimitation of 
the Continental Shelf in the Western Gulf of Mexico Beyond 200 Nautical 
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Source: Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the United Mexican States on the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf in the Western Gulf of Mexico Beyond 200 Nautical Miles. 



































Reproduced from: Treaty on Maritime Boundaries between the United 
States of America and the United Mexican States, signed at Mexico City, 
May 4, 1978. Three Treaties establishing Maritime Boundaries Between 
the United States and Mexico, Venezuela, and Cuba, 96th Congress 2nd 
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Source: Steven Groves, U.S. Accession to U.N. Convention on the Law of 
the Sea Unnecessary to Develop Oil and Gas Resources, Backgrounder No. 
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